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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it enforced the 
forum selection clause in Jacobsen's form contract and thereby contravened Utah public 
policy and generated duplicative litigation in two states? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's enforcement of a forum selection 
clause is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 
P.2d 809, 810 (Utah 1994); see also Durdahl v. National Safety Assocs., Inc., 988 P.2d 
525, 528 (Wyo. 1999). While Wyoming law governs the interpretation of Jacobsen's 
Contract, the Court looks to the public policies of the forum state—Utah—in determining 
whether to extend comity to Wyoming. See Durdahl 988 P.2d at 528; see also Trillium, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Board of County Commas, 2001 UT 101, ^ 19, 37 P.3d 1093. This issue 
was raised below. See Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 5-7 [R.45-47]; 
Reply Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 8-9 [R. 128-29]. 
Issue No. 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found 
jurisdiction over subcontractor-defendants where Jacobsen's form contract involves 
construction improvements to real property in Wyoming, was negotiated and performed 
in Wyoming, contains a bald forum selection clause for Utah—but no consent-to-
jurisdiction clause—and the only connection to Utah is Jacobsen's main office? 
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Standard of Review. Since the motion to dismiss was supported only by 
affidavits, an appeal from the trial court's decision "presents only legal questions that are 
reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 
1121 (Utah 1992). This issue was raised below. See Memorandum Supporting Motion 
to Dismiss at 12-14 [R.52-54]; Reply Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 1-
8 [R.121-28]. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3 is of central importance to the 
determination of Issue Number 1, above. This provision reads, in pertinent part: 
(2) A provision in a construction agreement 
requiring a dispute arising under the agreement to be resolved 
in a forum outside of this state is void and unenforceable as 
against the public policy of this state if: 
(a) one of the parties to the agreement is 
domiciled in this state; and 
(b) work to be done and the equipment and 
materials to be supplied under the agreement involves 
a construction project in this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3(2) (2001). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
The general contractor, Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc., 
("Jacobsen"), sued its carpentry subcontractor, Teton Builders, and Teton Builders' 
president, Thomas R. Hunter ("Hunter") (collectively "Subcontractors") on Jacobsen's 
form subcontract agreement ("Jacobsen's Contract") executed by the parties. Jacobsen's 
Contract provides for the construction of improvements on real property located in 
Wyoming, Jacobsen maintains an office in Wyoming, and Jacobsen's Contract was 
negotiated and performed solely in Wyoming. Subcontractors are both domiciled in 
Wyoming, and Subcontractors have no Utah contacts whatsoever. Thomas R. Hunter 
Affidavit ("Hunter Aff") at ffif 2-20. [R.42-44.] The parties stated that Wyoming law 
governs Jacobsen's Contract. Contract at f^ 8(1) (Exhibit A, attached). [R.17.] The only 
connection to Utah in this case is Jacobsen's head office located in Utah. The forum 
selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract designates Utah as the venue for resolving 
disputes. Id at f 7(C). [R.16.] Jacobsen's Contract does not include a consent-to-
jurisdiction clause by Subcontractors. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Subcontractors moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial 
court determined that the forum selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract is enforceable 
under Wyoming law. Transcript at 30 (Exhibit C, attached). The trial court ruled that 
Subcontractors agreed to the venue provision and impliedly consented to personal 
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jurisdiction in Utah. Id. Then, applying the "rational nexus" test set forth in Phone 
Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64,114, 8 P.3d 256, the trial court determined 
that the lone fact of Jacobsen's Utah domicile was a sufficient "rational nexus" with Utah 
on which to find personal jurisdiction over Subcontractors and denied the motion to 
dismiss. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2 (Exhibit D, attached). 
[R.14L] This Court granted an interlocutory appeal. 
Ill- STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Subcontractors, both residents of Jackson, Wyoming, presented 
uncontroverted evidence below that they have no contacts whatsoever with Utah. They 
have never worked, advertised, contracted, or conducted business of any nature within 
Utah's borders. Subcontractors executed Jacobsen's Contract to perform framing work 
on a hotel construction project on real property located in Jackson, Wyoming (the 
"Property").1 Jacobsen was the general contractor. Jacobsen's Wyoming-based 
employees finalized Jacobsen's Contract with Subcontractors through Jacobsen's 
Wyoming office, and the parties signed Jacobsen's Contract in Wyoming. All work 
under Jacobsen's Contract was performed in Wyoming, where the Property is located. 
Hunter Aff. at ffi[ 2-10, 18-19. [R.37-38.] 
Jacobsen's Contract contains a forum selection provision that reads: "All 
arbitration proceedings and litigation shall take place within Salt Lake County, State of 
1
 Subcontractors also executed Jacobsen's form Subcontract Work Order, which is 
attached as Exhibit B. 
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Utah." Contract at ^ 7(C) (Exhibit A, attached). [R.16.] Jacobsen's Contract also 
contains a choice of law provision electing Wyoming law: "This Agreement... shall be 
deemed to have been made in and shall be interpreted under the laws of the place where 
the project is located." Id. at f^ 8(1). [R.17.] There is no consent-to-jurisdiction clause in 
Jacobsen's Contract. 
Teton Builders recorded a mechanic's lien notice against the Property in 
Wyoming. Statement of Claim for Mechanics and Materialmens Lien (the "Lien 
Notice") (attached within Exhibit B to Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss). [R. 102-04.] Jacobsen filed a second action regarding this same dispute, 
currently pending in Wyoming state court, in which Jacobsen has sought to strike the lien 
against the Property. Richard Kirkham Affidavit at ffi[ 8-10. [R. 114.] 
Jacobsen obtained a payment bond (the "Payment Bond") from United 
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ("US Fidelity") as substitute security for Teton 
Builders' mechanic's lien in the event that the Wyoming court does not strike the lien. 
Id. at H 10. [R.114-15, 118-20.] The Payment Bond is payable to the owner of the 
Property, FS Jackson Hole Development Company, LLC, ("FS Jackson Hole"), and not 
Subcontractors. Payment Bond (attached as E^ x. 1 1o Kirkham Affidavit). [R.l 18.] FS 
Jackson Hole is a Delaware limited liability company domiciled in Wyoming. Lien 
Notice [R.102.] US Fidelity is a Maryland corporation domiciled in Minnesota. Payment 
Bond. [R.l 18-19.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The forum selection clause is unreasonable and against Utah public policy. 
Utah public policy recognizes the importance of requiring construction litigation to be 
adjudicated in the state where the subject property is located, along with the need to bring 
disputes in one action. It is unreasonable and unfair to force Subcontractors to defend 
two competing lawsuits in Wyoming and Utah—an inevitable result if the trial court 
retains jurisdiction. On these bases, the Court should determine that the forum selection 
clause is unenforceable. 
The trial court's ruling further raises a question of first impression, namely, 
what standards should determine personal jurisdiction where an out-of-state 
subcontractor with no Utah contacts signs a Utah general contractor's form construction 
contract containing a Utah forum selection clause—but no consent-to-jurisdiction clause. 
This dispute has no relation to Utah but is instead centered upon out-of-state real 
property. Based on the plurality of opinions in Henderson, the "rational nexus" test only 
governs contracts that include consent-to-jurisdiction clauses. Thus, traditional minimum 
contacts analysis applies here. Since Subcontractors have no minimum contacts, this 
action should be dismissed and the parties should resolve their dispute in Jacobsen's 
second action in Wyoming. 
Finally, even if the "rational nexus" test should apply here, the trial court 
misapplied it. Because Jacobsen's Contract was for construction improvements to real 
property located outside Utah, Jacobsen acted as a Wyoming resident with respect to 
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Jacobsen's Contract, and the only connection to Utah is the fact of Jacobsen's head 
office, there is no "rational nexus." 
This Court should reverse and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENFORCED JACOBSEN'S 
FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE BECAUSE THE CLAUSE IS 
UNREASONABLE AND AGAINST UTAH PUBLIC POLICY, 
Before even reaching the issue of personal jurisdiction, the trial court 
should have determined that the forum selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract is 
unenforceable. Under Jacobsen's Contract, Wyoming law governs. See Contract at f^ 
8(1) (Exhibit A, attached). [R.17.] In Wyoming—as in Utah and other jurisdictions—a 
forum selection clause is not enforceable if it is unreasonable, against a public policy of 
the forum state, or the chosen forum is seriously inconvenient. See Durdahl v. National 
Safety Assocs., Inc., 988 P.2d 525, 528, 530 (Wyo. 1999). Accord Prows v. Pinpoint 
Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 812-13 (Utah 1994) (finding forum selection clause 
unenforceable based on a number of factors, including increased cost, policy 
considerations, unfairness, and inconvenience); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 
407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). Enforcement of the forum selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract 
is unreasonable, against public policy, and seriously inconvenient. Based on the totality 
of these circumstances, the forum selection clause should not be enforced, particularly 
where the improvements to the subject property are located in Wyoming and Jacobsen's 
second action regarding the lien is pending in Wyoming. 
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A. Enforcement of Jacobsen's Forum Selection Clause Is 
Unreasonable and It Violates Utah Public Policy Regarding the 
Venue for Construction Disputes. 
The Utah Legislature has recognized a public policy of voiding out-of-state 
forum selection clauses in construction litigation that involves Utah real property. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3(2) (cited in full in Determinative Provision section, above). 
Importantly, it is the public policy of the forum state—Utah—that controls the Court's 
analysis of whether to enforce the forum selection clause. See Durdahl, 988 P.2d at 528 
(holding that while Tennessee law governed contract, Wyoming court will enforce law of 
foreign jurisdiction "so long as that law is not contrary to Wyoming law, public policy, or 
the general interests of Wyoming's citizens"). 
As stated by the Bremen Court, "A contractual choice-of-forum clause 
should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of 
the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision." 407 
U.S. at 15; see also Robv v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2dCir. 1993) 
(although parties chose English law in contract, holding under Bremen that forum 
selection clause is unreasonable if it "contravene[s] a strong public policy of the forum 
state"). Likewise, this Court has recognized that when determining whether to extend 
comity to another state's laws, "'[o]f primary importance [to Utah courts] is whether 
[Utah's] public policies . . . would be contravened if comity were extended.'" Trillium, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 101,1f 19, 37 P.3d 1093 (quoting 
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Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)). 
Utah public policy relating to the venue for construction disputes is set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3. Under this provision, if there is a dispute involving 
construction work performed in Utah and a Utah resident, a forum selection clause that 
requires litigation of that construction dispute in a forum other than Utah violates Utah's 
public policy and is unenforceable. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3(2). Utah is not alone 
in recognizing the importance of keeping construction litigation within the forum where 
the property is located. Admittedly, the present case involves an inverse scenario— 
namely a Utah forum selection clause involving improvements to Wyoming real 
property. However, the same Utah public policy should apply when a Utah court is asked 
to adjudicate disputes over real property in Wyoming. The Court should refuse to 
enforce a Utah forum selection clause involving Wyoming real property where the Utah 
resident is also resident in Wyoming, maintains offices in Wyoming, and seeks out 
business in Wyoming. As a matter of public policy, there is no compelling reason for 
Utah courts to waste judicial resources serving as the adjudicator of Wyoming's real 
property disputes. 
2
 See V. Frederic Lyon & Douglas W. Ackerman, Controlling Disputes by Controlling 
the Forum: Forum Selection Clauses in Construction Contracts, 22 Construction Law. 15, 21 & 
nn.70-72 (Fall 2002) (citing similar provisions in Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah). 
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B, Public Policy Concerns Militate in Favor of Refusing to Enforce 
Jacobsen's Forum Selection Clause, Which Generates 
Duplicative, Bifurcated Litigation over the Same Facts. 
Jacobsen's filing of litigation in two states was spawned by the forum 
selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract; therefore, enforcement of the forum selection 
clause is unreasonable, seriously inconvenient, and against public policy. See Durdahl, 
988 P.2d at 528, 530; Prows, 868 P.2d at 812-13. The perpetuation of this action in Utah 
will not eliminate the second Jacobsen litigation that Subcontractors must defend in 
Wyoming regarding the same facts, nor the Payment Bond litigation that will occur in 
Wyoming regarding the same facts. 
This Court in Prows recognized Utah's public policy of avoiding bifurcated 
litigation. The Utah-resident plaintiff in that case, Prows, brought suit in Utah against 
two co-defendants, Flying J in Utah and Pinpoint in New York, notwithstanding a New 
York forum selection clause in the contract to which Pinpoint, but not Flying J, was a 
party. Prows, 868 P.2d at 809-10. Pinpoint moved to dismiss for lack of venue, seeking 
to enforce the New York forum selection clause, which would have resulted in a New 
York action against Pinpoint and a Utah action against Flying J. Id at 813. The trial 
court denied the motion to dismiss and this Court affirmed, recognizing that "[requiring 
a bifurcated trial on the same issues contravenes the 'objective of modern procedure,' 
which is to 'litigate all claims in one action if that is possible.'" Id. at 813 (quoting 
Dversburg Mach. Works, Inc. v. Rentenbach Eng'g Co., 650 S.W.2d 378, 380-81 (Tenn. 
10 
1983)). Based on these "policy considerations" and other factors, such as the unfairness, 
inconvenience, and increased cost of maintaining two separate actions over the same 
facts, the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling invalidating the forum selection clause. 
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The result here should be no different. Indeed, Subcontractors and 
Jacobsen are already involved in Jacobsen's mechanic's lien litigation in Wyoming. See 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at Ex. B. [R.96-107.] 
Attempting to avoid Teton Builders' Wyoming lien foreclosure action, Jacobsen has 
provided the Payment Bond, issued by US Fidelity, to the owner of the Property, FS 
Jackson Hole. [R. 118.] However, the Payment Bond does not, as Jacobsen suggested to 
the trial court, open Utah's courts to all of Subcontractors' claims relating to the Property. 
While Subcontractors' counterclaim against Jacobsen can be brought in 
Wyoming or Utah, claims related to Subcontractors' mechanic's lien and the Payment 
Bond are inseparably connected to Wyoming. Based on the filing of the Payment Bond, 
the mechanic's lien is discharged and the Payment Bond is substituted for the lien. See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-310. Nevertheless, Teton Builders cannot bring an action in Utah 
on the Payment Bond unless the trial court in Utah is able to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the owner, FS Jackson Hole, and eventually perhaps the bonding 
company, US Fidelity. 
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As with Flying J in the Prows case, neither FS Jackson Hole nor US 
Fidelity was a party to Jacobsen's Contract containing the forum selection clause. 
Moreover, like Flying J in Prows, there was no evidence below that FS Jackson Hole— 
domiciled in Wyoming—or US Fidelity—domiciled in Minnesota—is subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the selected forum (Utah).3 As a result, there may be no basis for Teton 
Builders to sue in Utah on the Payment Bond. Indeed, for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
Utah courts "'would be closed to the suit'" on the Payment Bond—yet another proper 
basis under Prows for invalidating the forum selection clause. 868 P.2d at 812 n.5 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80, cmt. c). 
Jacobsen's dual litigation in Wyoming and Utah will try the exact same 
facts. At the heart of this case is whether Teton Builders performed under Jacobsen's 
Contract for improvements to the Property located in Wyoming. In any Wyoming action 
on the Payment Bond, precisely the same facts will be tried, with possibly different 
Based on the trial court record quoted in Prows, the trial court appeared to assume— 
without taking relevant evidence—that Flying J was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New 
York: 
To require the plaintiff to go to New York to litigate where Flying J cannot be a 
part of a lawsuit, because clearly you can't get Flying J there unless there's 
personal jurisdiction on some basis we haven't talked about, then this entire issue 
can't be resolved in one case, we're going to have to try part of it here, part of it 
in New York, and that assuming the State of New York will take it. 
868 P.2d at 812 (quoting trial court record) (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in the present case, 
the record only reflects that FS Jackson Hole and US Fidelity are domiciled outside Utah. Since 
there is no evidence that either entity is subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah, the Court can, as 
in Prows, determine that dual litigation will likely result from enforcing the forum selection 
clause—not to mention the dual litigation that has already resulted from Jacobsen's filing of two 
separate actions. 
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outcomes. Permitting Jacobsen, a large general contractor found in multiple states, to 
pursue such dual litigation effectively doubles the smaller Subcontractors' litigation 
expenses. Subcontractors must retain lawyers in both Wyoming and Utah. Depositions 
and other discovery must be performed in both Wyoming and Utah. Two separate trials 
will be held over identical issues. Then, when the two cases are concluded, the parties 
face the possibility of conflicting rulings from Utah and Wyoming courts on the same 
claims or issues, which will lead to a morass of conflicting enforcement issues. 
Such a result is unfair and unreasonable, and contravenes Utah's public 
policy. As the plaintiff maintained in Prows, dual litigation over the same facts is 
"chaotic and prohibitively expensive." 868 P.2d at 812. This Court should maintain the 
public policy recognized in Prows and spare the parties the expense and uncertainty that 
will likely result from two competing lawsuits by reversing the trial court's ruling 
enforcing Jacobsen's forum selection clause. This will require the parties to pursue the 
action in Wyoming, where the property is, among all of the parties and involving all 
relevant claims arising from this Wyoming construction project. On remand, the trial 
court should then be instructed to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN APPLYING HENDERSON 
AND FINDING A RATIONAL NEXUS BASED SOLELY ON 
JACOBSEN'S UTAH HEAD OFFICE. 
Even if the forum selection clause is enforceable, the trial court still should 
have dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court determined under the 
"rational nexus" test of Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256, 
that a rational nexus with Utah exists in this case solely on the basis of Jacobsen's head 
office being located in Utah. 
The trial court erred in applying the "rational nexus" test for two reasons. 
First, based on the plurality in Henderson, the "rational nexus" test only applies when 
there is a consent-to-jurisdiction clause in the parties' contract. Since Jacobsen's 
Contract did not contain any consent-to-jurisdiction clause, the trial court should have 
applied the traditional minimum contacts analysis. Second, even if the "rational nexus" 
test applied to this case—and it does not—there can be no rational nexus with Utah in an 
action over improvements to real property located in Wyoming. There is no connection 
to Utah at all, apart from plaintiffs Utah head office. 
A. Henderson Js "Rational Nexus" Test Only Applies When There is 
a Consent-to-Jurisdiction Clause, 
Based on the concurrences to the plurality opinion in Henderson, there is no 
basis for even applying the Henderson "rational nexus" test in this case, which involves a 
forum selection clause, but no consent-to-jurisdiction clause. On this basis, the Court 
should reverse. 
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The Henderson Court examined a contract between a Utah-based plaintiff, 
Phone Directories Co., and its defendant employee in California, Henderson. Phone 
Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ffif 3-4, 8 P.3d 256. The parties' contract in 
that case contained a forum—or venue—selection clause selecting Utah, along with a 
consent-to-jurisdiction clause under which the parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction 
of the Utah courts. Id. at t 7 & n.2. 
The plaintiffs Utah office was not the only connection to Utah in 
Henderson. There, Henderson visited Phone Directories' Utah offices, negotiated the 
contract in Utah, and made numerous other contacts with plaintiffs Utah offices. Id. at f 
16. 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Durham observed that "a forum 
selection/consent to jurisdiction clause by itself is not sufficient to confer personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant as a matter of law." IcL at f 14 (Durham, J., plurality 
opinion). Rather, there must still be "a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or 
consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject 
matter of the contract." IcL This standard for personal jurisdiction is a lesser standard for 
the plaintiff to meet than that required by the Due Process Clause and Utah's long-arm 
statute—i.e., the minimum contacts analysis. See id. However, only Judge Bench 
(sitting by designation) joined in the lead opinion. 
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Justice Wilkins (with Justice Russon) concurred in the result, writing that 
personal jurisdiction was appropriate pursuant to the minimum contacts analysis, and that 
there was no basis for creating a new test under the facts of Henderson. Id. at |^ 23 
(Wilkins, J., concurring). Then-Chief-Justice Howe also concurred in the result of Justice 
Durham's opinion, but only with respect to the enforceability of the forum selection 
clause, which according to Justice Howe is determined by previous rulings of this Court. 
Id. at f 20 (Howe, C.J., concurring). Justice Howe joined in Justice Durham's adoption 
of a "rational nexus" test only with respect to the consent-to-jurisdiction clause. Id. at f^ 
22 (Howe, C.J., concurring). In sum, based on the concurring opinions in Henderson, the 
"rational nexus" test may only apply to forum selection clauses where there is also a 
consent-to-jurisdiction clause. 
In the instant case, the parties never bargained for a consent-to-jurisdiction 
clause. There is no such clause in Jacobsen's Contract. [R.9-17.] Rather, Jacobsen's 
Contract provides solely for venue in Utah. Contract at Tf 7(C) (Exhibit A, attached). 
[R.16.] As a result, under Henderson, there is no basis for applying the "rational nexus" 
test to the personal jurisdiction issue in this case. Rather, Jacobsen bears the burden of 
establishing requisite minimum contacts, a burden which it has not met. Jacobsen has not 
refuted that Subcontractors have no contacts at all with Utah, but instead assumed this 
fact for purposes of Subcontractors' motion to dismiss. See Memorandum Opposing 
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Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1. [R.62.] On this basis, there is no personal 
jurisdiction and the Court should reverse. 
B. There Can Be No Rational Nexus Based Solely on the Plaintiffs 
Domicile, Particularly When the Entire Action Is Based on 
Improvements to Real Property Outside Utah. 
Alternatively, even if Jacobsen's forum selection clause invoked the lesser 
"rational nexus" test of Henderson (and it does not), Jacobsen cannot meet its burden of 
showing a rational nexus in this case because all relevant factors militate in favor of 
resolution in and are inseparably connected with Wyoming. The Henderson plurality 
recognized that consent "by itself is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant as a matter of law." Id, at f^ 14 (plurality opinion). Rather, the plaintiff must 
still establish "a rational nexus between this state and either the parties to or the subject 
matter of the contract." Id. at }^ 15. 
A sufficient rational nexus existed in Henderson, where the defendant at 
least visited the plaintiffs Utah offices, negotiated the contract in Utah, and had 
numerous contacts with plaintiffs Utah offices. 2000 UT 64 at ^ 16. According to at 
least two Justices, these contacts were even sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts 
analysis. Id at |^ 23 (Wilkins, J., concurring). 
This action, in contrast, is a complete stranger to Utah. Subcontractors lack 
any contacts at all with Utah. Jacobsen's form Contract was executed, negotiated, and 
performed in Wyoming through Jacobsen's Wyoming office by Jacobsen's Wyoming-
based personnel. Jacobsen's Contract provides for the construction of improvements on 
17 
real property located in Wyoming. Subcontractors are Wyoming residents with no 
contacts whatsoever to Utah. Jacobsen's Contract designates that Wyoming law applies. 
The single connection to Utah in this action is that Jacobsen is a Utah-based company, 
even though Jacobsen acted in, maintained offices in and was itself a resident of 
Wyoming. 
By finding a rational nexus in this case, the court below stretched 
Henderson to a most absurd end because, after its ruling, a Utah general contractor 
plaintiff may require all of its construction disputes in sister states involving real property 
in those states to be brought in Utah. Based on the trial court's ruling below, all that need 
be shown is that the plaintiff is domiciled in Utah and nothing more; the Henderson rule 
requiring consent to jurisdiction and some additional nexus is essentially rendered 
meaningless. If the trial court's ruling is upheld, Henderson is useful only in cases where 
none of the parties resided in Utah and where the contract was not entered into or to be 
performed in this state. Rather than permit such a result, the Court should lend meaning 
to Henderson by reversing the trial court's denial of Subcontractors' motion to dismiss 
and concluding that there is no rational nexus with Utah in this case. Jacobsen may still 
pursue its claims in its second action filed in Wyoming, whose courts are open to all 
additional claims that can be brought with respect to the Property or the Payment Bond. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Subcontractors Teton Builders and Thomas 
R. Hunter respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's order denying the 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and remand to the trial court with 
instructions to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
DATED this ~^° day of February, 2004. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
By: 
R. Stephen Marshal 
Erik A. Olson 
Attorneys for Appellants Thomas R. Hunter 
and Teton Builders 
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MASTER SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT Rev. 9/Q0 
Agreement No. 1983 
i AGREEMENT, made at Salt Lake City, Utah, as of the _ 3 j j L _ day of June 20 ^ 2 _ by and between 
3BSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., hereinafter referred to as Contractor, and 
_^  Teton Builders 1200 Gregory Lane Jackson, WY 83QQ1 an independent contractor, 
inafter referred to as Subcontractor. The term Subcontractor as used herein includes Subcontractor's suppliers and subcontractors, 
{dings used in this Agreement are general in nature and have no legal effect This Master Subcontract Agreement (MSA) sets out 
general rights and responsibilities of the parties hereto for work to be performed by Subcontractor on one or more future projects, 
specific terms and conditions related to a specific project will be set out in a subsequently-executed Subcontractor Work Order 
/O), the terms of which shall be deemed part of this Agreement. 
For and in consideration of the covenants herein contained, Contractor and Subcontractor agree as follows: 
-SCOPE OF WORK 
General. Subcontractor shall furnish and pay for all supervision, labor, materials, tools, equipment, scaffolding, 
templates, testing, permits, fees, etc. required to do and complete ail of the work set out in a SWO in strict accordance 
with the Subcontract Documents which are: (1) this Agreement; (2) the Prime Contract which is, as used herein, the 
agreement between Owner and Contractor and the contract documents related thereto,including General, Supplementary 
and other Conditions of the contract, drawings, the project manual/specifications, Addenda per Paragraph 1C of a SWO, 
change orders, construction directives or modifications to the Prime Contract issued subsequent to the execution of the 
agreement between Owner and Contractor (whether before or after the execution of the applicable SWO), and any other 
contract documents listed in the agreement between Owner and Contractor; (3) Change Authorizations or modifications 
to a SWO issued by Contractor after execution of the applicable SWO; (4) any subsequently-issued SWO tied to this 
Master Subcontract Agreement; and (5) other documents listed herein or in a SWO. The Subcontract Documents are as 
fully a part of this Agreement as if attached hereto or repeated herein. Subcontractor may review relevant portions of the 
Subcontract Documents at Contractor's main office with reasonable notice. Contractor and Subcontractor are hereby 
strictly bound to each other by the terms and requirements of the Prime Contract insofar as those terms and requirements 
are applicable to this Agreement and to the work to be done by Subcontractor. If any taf the terms or requirements of the 
Prime Contract are contradictory with any of the terms or requirements of this Agreement and/orthe applicable SWO, the 
terms and conditions which place the highest duty and/or more stringent requirements upon Subcontractor shall govern 
(e.g. Paragraph SQ). Any notation such as "by contractor" or "by general contractor" in the Subcontract Documents 
connected with work which would, absent the notation, be the responsibility of Subcontractor per this Agreement, shall 
be interpreted to read "by Subcontractor". 
2. PROSECUTION OF WORK, SAFETY, E.E.O., ETC. 
A. Commencement of Work/Execution of a SWO. A SWO shall not be binding upon the parties hereto unless the Prime 
Contract related to the SWO is executed by the parties thereto and approval for Contractor to proceed under the Prime 
Contract is given by Owner or its representative. If Subcontractor has received its copy of a SWO for signature and 
thereafter works for more than five (5) work days "on site prior to signing the SWO, said work shall be deemed to be 
acceptance by Subcontractor of the SWO in its entirety. By signing the SWO or, as noted herein, working on site, 
Subcontractor represents that it has (1) visited and inspected the site of the work, and (2) carefully reviewed the 
Subcontract Documents and is thus aware of any impact, relationship, or interference which the site, site conditions, 
climate, construction sequence, Subcontract Documents, and/orthe work of other subcontractors or contractors will have 
upon'Subcontractor's rights} duties, access, operations, efficiency, etc. 
B, Performance. Time is strictly of the essence of this Agreement Subcontractor therefore agrees: (i) to procure and 
prepare its materials so as to be ready to begin work when directed by Contractor; (2) to plan, prosecute, and complete its 
work in a prompt and diligent manner so as not to delay, disrupt, hinder or interfere with the work of Contractor or other 
subcontractors; (3) to commence the several parts thereof at such times and proceed therewith in such order as may be 
directed by Contractor; (4) to provide, at its expense, additional workers and/or to work on an overtime or shift basis 
should Contractor reasonably so direct; (5) to do ail layout, cutting, fitting and patching of its work as may be required to 
make its several parts come together properly and to fit it to receive or be received by the work of Contractor or other 
subcontractors, ail as shown upon or reasonably implied by the Subcontract Documents; (6) to proceed in a skillful and 
expeditious manner, with sufficient labor, materials, tools, equipment, and supplies; and (7) to complete the several pans 
and the whole of said work as provided herein so thai, in conjunction with other subcontractors engaged thereon, 
Subcontractor will insure the uninterrupted progress of the project and enable Contractor to complete the project as 
scheduled by Contractor. Subconrractor and its employees will not participate in or honor any union picketing, stnke, 
leafleting, slowdown, work stoppage, etc. 
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C. Schedules. For purposes of scheduling the work, Contractor may periodically deveLop and modify project schedule(s). 
Contractor retains the right to modify said schedule(s), change work sequences and priorities, and to otherwise schedule 
the work so as to achieve timely project completion and interim project milestone dates. Subcontractor agrees to adapt its 
efforts and to meet Contractor's schedule(s) as modified without additional cost to Contractor and/or Owner. 
D. Time Extensions and Compensation Related Thereto. As between Contractor and Subcontractor, the time-for 
Subcontractor's performance may be extended in writing at any time by Contractor. Subcontractor shall receive 
compensation from Contractor for a delay but, only to the extent that Contractor receives compensation from Owner for 
costs and/or damages incurred by Subcontractor as a result of said delay. Further, Subcontractor shall not be entitled 
to either additional time or additional compensation related to delays unless written claim for same is received by 
Contractor within seven (7) days of the commencement of a particular cause of delay. Any claim for additional 
time related to a change in the work or changed conditions must be submitted with Subcontractor's pricing 
information for said change (see Article 5). For delays and/or damages attributable to suppliers or other 
subcontractors, see Paragraph 2G. 
E. Failure to Prosecute the Work/Insolvency, If Subcontractor shall at any time: (1) refuse or neglect to supply a sufficient 
number of properly skilled workers or sufficient materials of the proper quality, or (2) fail in any respect to prosecute the 
work with promptness, or (3) fail promptly to remove and replace work condemned by Owner, Architect or Contractor 
and make good the work of others damaged by said replacement, or (4) cause by any action or omission the stoppage of, 
delay of or interference with the work of Contractor or any other subcontractor, or (5) fail in the performance of any of 
the material covenants of the Subcontract Documents, or (6) to be adjudged a bankrupt or make a general assignment for 
the benefit of creditors, or (7) become insolvent or a debtor in reorganization, receivership, composition or arrangement 
proceedings; then three (3) days after delivery of a written notice to Subcontractor indicating the existence of any of the 
foregoing causes, and unless the cause specified in such notice is eliminated within such three (3) days, Contractor at its 
option may provide, either by itself or through others, labor and materials to prosecute and complete the work and shall 
deduct the cost thereof from any amounts then due or thereafter to become due to Subcontractor. In any such event, after 
such notice and Subcontractor's failure to eliminate such cause within the three (3) days specified, Contractor may at its 
option (and without prejudice to any other remedy Contractor may have) terminate all or part of this Agreement and a 
related S WO "for cause" and, for the purpose of completing the work, take possession of all or part of the materials and 
equipment of Subcontractor at the project site^ all of which Subcontractor hereby assigns to Contractor. Contractor may 
then complete the work by whatever reasonable method Contractor deems expedient In case of such partial or total 
termination for cause, Subcontractor shall not be entitled to receive any further payment until the work required by the 
S WO is fully complete and accepted by Owner and Architect; and at such time, if the unpaid balance of the amount to be 
paid hereunder exceeds Contractor's cost, such excess shall be paid by Contractor to Subcontractor, but if Contractor's 
cost exceeds the unpaid balance, Subcontractor shall promptly pay the difference to Contractor. "Cost" as used in this 
Paragraph 2E shall include: (1) Contractor's expenses incurred in taking over and completing Subcontractor's work, (2) 
damages incurred by Contractor due to Subcontractor's non-performance, etc., and (3) reasonable charges for Contractor's 
overhead and profit. 
F. Damages. If Subcontractor fails to prosecute the work as required in this Agreement and/or a SWO, Subcontractor shall 
be liable for (1) either actual or liquidated damages per the Subcontract Documents to compensate Owner for its costs 
related to Subcontractor's non-performance, and also (2) actual damages incurred by Contractor and its subcontractors 
and suppliers related to Subcontractor's non-performance. Subcontractor's responsibility for such damages shall exist 
regardless of whether Contractor elects to take over Subcontractor's work per Paragraph 2E. -Contractor and 
Subcontractor shall not be liable to one another for any delays arising out of acts of God, strikes (except as described in 
Paragraph 2B), or other causes explicitly determined to be beyond their control; except in the event that Owner assesses 
damages or penalties against Contractor, then Subcontractor shall be responsible for such portion of said assessment as is 
attributable to Subcontractor, regardless of the cause of delay. 
G
- Suppliers and Other Subcontractors. Subcontractor agrees that it has a duty to coordinate and communicate with 
suppliers and other subcontractors on the project. Contractor shall not be liable to Subcontractor for any damages, loss or 
expense resulting from acts or omissions (whether or not negligent), failure to perform, delays in performance, or defaults 
of a suppjier or another subcontractor in connection with the performance of any of the work covered by the Prime 
Contract and/or this Agreement and/or a SWO. Any claim or invoice of Subcontractor for such damages, loss or expense 
shah be made and any action shall be filed, directly against said other party without making Owner or Contractor a party 
to any action brought upon such claim. Subcontractor agrees that any project supplier or subcontractor shall have a direct 
right of action against Subcontractor for damages, loss or expense resulting from Subcontractor's acts or omissions 
(whether or not negligent), failure to perform, delays in performance, or default. 
H. Safety, Subcontractor agrees to provide its employees with safe tools, equipment, etc.; to provide them with a safe place 
to work; to perform the work under this Agreement in a safe manner with high regard for the safety of its employees and 
others; and to comply with prevailing safety regulations, whether federal, state, local or otherwise imposed. Whenever 
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Subcontractor is working on the project, it shall have on site a competent safety representative who, in addition to his or 
her other duties, shall be responsible for implementing and administering Subcontractor's safety program, including 
consistent safety training of Subcontractor's employees and holding documented weekly jobsite safety meetings with its 
employees. Contractor shall have the right (but not the duty) to review said documentation. Subcontractor shall 
immediately remedy any unsafe conditions brought to its attention or discovered by Subcontractor involving its work 
and/or posing a danger to persons or property. Subcontractor, on behalf of its employees, grants to Contractor the right 
to periodically make random searches of vehicles on site, lunch boxes,-tool"boxes, etc. for controlled or prohibited 
substances and/or stolen tools, materials, etc. Subcontractor shall not permit its employees'at the project to use publicly 
audible radios or to wear head sets except as are used for job site communications. Subcontractors on-site employees 
shall wear long or short sleeve shirts, long pants, sturdy shoes or boots, and hard hats (except when Subcontractor obtains 
a written waiver from Contractor for specific areas of the project where hard hats are not required by governmental or 
Owner safety regulations). Only certified model ANSI Z89.1-1986 class B conventional hardhats shall be worn. Bump 
caps and hard hats without a rounded dome, such as cowboy hardhats, are not allowed. Subcontractor shall have on site a 
first-aid kit adequate for the needs of its employees. Smoking or chewing of tobacco by Subcontractor's employees will 
be permitted only in Contractor-designated areas. Prior to bringing on site a substance or material for which a Material 
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) is- required by governmental regulations, Subcontractor shall provide said MSDS to 
Contractor. Contractor shall provide temporary lighting for general access (e.g. corridors) and Subcontractor shall 
provide all necessary task lighting in its work areas. 
L E.E.O./Affirmative Action/Wage-Hour Requirements. Subcontractor shall fully comply with wage-hour regulations and 
shall take vigorous affirmative action to comply with E.E-O. and Affirmative Action Clauses 41 CFR 60-1.4,41 CFR 60-
250.4, and 41 CFR 60-741.4 as revised, amended or superseded whenever required by law or by the Subcontract 
Documents, and is encouraged to do so in the absence of such requirement. Subcontractor shall also comply in all 
respects with the terms for employment and payment of labor required by Owner and/or any constituted authority having -
legal jurisdiction over the work. 
J- Fines. If Subcontractor's alleged acts or omissions result in a fine or penalty being levied against Contractor by any 
lawful regulatory agency or court, then the amount so levied shall be for Subcontractor's account and may be deducted 
from amounts otherwise due Subcontractor. 
K. Supervision/Authority. Subcontractor shall provide competent and continuous supervision of its work. Instructions 
given by Contractor to Subcontractor's superintendent or foreman, and documents executed by and commitments made by 
said superintendent or foreman shall be binding upon Subcontractor, Unless Subcontractor provides Contractor with a 
list defining those employees who are authorized to sign for Subcontractor, any employee of Subcontractor who signs a 
document for Subcontractor shall be deemed to be an authorized representative of Subcontractor. Said list must be sent 
via certified U.S. mail, and shall become operative seven (7) days after it is received by Contractor. 
L. Progress Reports. Subcontractor shall furnish to Contractor periodic progress reports on Subcontractor's work as 
reasonably requested, including information on the status'of materials and equipment which may be in the course of 
preparation or manufacture. 
M. Acceptance of the Work of Others. Should the proper performance or appearance of Subcontractor's work depend 
wholly or partially upon any work or materials furnished b"y Contractor or others, Subcontractor agrees to use all 
reasonable means necessary to discover any relevant defects therein and report same in writing to Contractor before 
proceeding with its work which is affected thereby and shall allow Contractor a reasonable time in which to remedy such 
defects. In the event Subcontractor does not so report to Contractor in writing, then it shall be assumed that 
Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and Subcontractor shall be fully responsible 
thereafter for satisfactory performance of the work covered by this Agreement, regardless of the defective work of others. 
N. Incidental Charges, Unless otherwise noted in this Agreement or a related SWO, reasonable amounts for unloading, 
hoisting, clean- up, templates, layout or other services provided by Contractor for Subcontractor, and reasonable amounts 
for Contractor's equipment, tools, etc. used by Subcontractor shall be deducted from amounts otherwise due 
Subcontractor. Backcharge type charges for incidental extra work performed by one party at the request of the other 
party, or for the benefit of the other party, or in the event of default by the other party shall be charged at actual field cost 
plus a 15% charge for home office overhead and profit. 
O. Permits, Fees and Codes. Subcontractor shall, at its own cost and expense, pay all fees related to the execution of its 
work; apply for and obtain all necessary permits, licenses, etc.; and conform strictly to the laws, building codes and 
ordinances in force insofar as applicable to the work covered by a SWO. 
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Subcontractor is working on the project, it shall have on site a competent safety representative who, in addition to his or 
her other duties, shall be responsible for implementing and administering Subcontractor's safety program, including 
consistent safety training of Subcontractor's employees and holding documented weekly jobsite safety meetings with its 
employees. Contractor shall have the right (but not the duty) to-review said documentation. Subcontractor shall 
immediately remedy any unsafe conditions brought to its attention or discovered by Subcontractor involving its work 
and/or posing a danger to persons or property. Subcontractor, on behalf of its employees, grants to Contractor the right 
to periodically make random searches of vehicles on site, lunch boxes, tool boxes, etc. for controlled or prohibited 
substances and/or stolen tools, materials, etc. Subcontractor shall riot permit its empfoyees at the project to use publicly 
audible radios or to wear head sets except as are used for job site communications. Subcontractor's on-site employees 
shall wear long or short sleeve shirts, long pants, sturdy shoes or boots, and hard hats (except when Subcontractor obtains 
a written waiver from Contractor for specific areas of the project where hard hats are not required by governmental or 
Owner safety regulations). Only certified model ANSI Z89.1-1986 class B conventional hardhats shall be worn. Bump 
caps and hard hats without a rounded dome, such as cowboy hardhats, are not allowed. Subcontractor shall have on site a 
first-aid kit adequate for the needs of its employees. Smoking or chewing of tobacco by-Subcontractor's employees will 
be permitted only in Contractor-designated areas. Priorto bringing on site a substance or material for which a Material 
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) is required by governmental regulations, Subcontractor shall provide said MSDS to 
Contractor. Contractor shall provide.temporary lighting for general access (e.g. corridors) and Subcontractor shall 
provide all necessary task lighting in its work areas. 
I. E.E.OVAffirmative Action/Wage-Hour Requirements. Subcontractor shall fully comply with wage-hour regulations and 
shall take vigorous affirmative action to comply with E.E.O. and Affirmative Action Clauses 41 CFR 60-1.4,41 CFR 60-
250.4, and 41 CFR 60-741.4 as revised, amended or superseded whenever required by law or by the Subcontract 
Documents, and is encouraged to do so in the absence of such requirement. Subcontractor shall also comply in ail 
respects with the terms for employment and payment of labor required by Owner and/or any constituted authority having 
legal jurisdiction over the work. 
J. Fines. If Subcontractor's alleged acts or omissions result in a fine or penalty being levied against Contractor by any 
lawful regulatory agency or court, then the amount so levied shall be for Subcontractor's account and may be deducted 
from amounts otherwise due Subcontractor. 
K. Supervision/Authority. Subcontractor shall provide competent and continuous supervision of its work. Instructions 
given by Contractor to Subcontractor's superintendent or foreman, and documents executed by and commitments made by 
said superintendent or foreman shall be binding upon Subcontractor. Unless Subcontractor provides Contractor with a 
list defining those employees who are authorized to sign for Subcontractor, any employee of Subcontractor who signs a 
document for Subcontractor shall be deemed to be an authorized representative of Subcontractor. Said list must be sent 
via certified U.S. mail, and shall become operative seven (7) days after it is received by Contractor. 
L. Progress Reports. Subcontractor shall furnish to Contractor periodic progress reports on Subcontractor's work as 
reasonably requested, including information on the status of materials and equipment which may be in the course of 
preparation or manufacture. 
M. Acceptance of the Work of Others. Should the proper performance or appearance of Subcontractor's work depend 
wholly or partially upon any work or materials furnished by Contractor or others, Subcontractor agrees to use all 
reasonable means necessary to discover any relevant defects therein and report same in writing to Contractor before 
proceeding with its work which is affected thereby and shall allow Contractor a reasonable time in which to remedy such 
defects. In the event Subcontractor does not so report to Contractor in writing, then it shall be assumed that 
Subcontractor has fully acceptedthe work of others as being satisfactory and Subcontractor shall be fully responsible 
thereafter for satisfactory performance of the work covered by this Agreement, regardless of the defective work of others. 
N. Incidental Charges. Unless otherwise noted in this Agreement or a related SWO, reasonable amounts for unloading, 
hoisting, clean- up, templates, layout or other services provided by Contractor for Subcontractor, and reasonable amounts 
for Contractor's equipment, tools, etc. used by Subcontractor shall be deducted from amounts otherwise due 
Subcontractor. Backcharge type charges for incidental extra work performed by one party at the request of the other 
party, or for the benefit of the other party, or in the event of default by the other party shall be charged at actual field cost 
plus a 15% charge for home office overhead and profit. 
0. Permits, Fees and Codes. Subcontractor shall, at its own cost and expense, pay all fees related to the execution of its 
work; apply for and obtain all necessary permits, licenses, etc.; and conform strictly to the laws, building codes and 
ordinances in force insofar as applicable to the work covered by a SWO. 
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P IndeDendent Contractor/Taxes. Subcontractor represents and agrees that it is an independent contractor in fact and also 
within the scope of the United States Internal Revenue Code; Social Security arid unemployment insurance laws and 
regulations; applicable safety, health and environmental laws and regulations (e.g. OSHA, MSHA); and applicable 
collective bargaining agreements and is solely responsible for: (1) its compliance with such laws, regulations, and 
agreements, (2) all payroll taxes, and (3) all trust fund and other deductions, withholdings and contributions payable 
under such laws, regulations and agreements. The contract amount includes all applicable sales and use taxes; franchise, 
excise and other taxes; and governmental impositions of all kinds and is not subject to any addition for any such taxes or 
impositions now or hereafter levied. 
Q G u ar an te e/Warranty.. During the guarantee (or warranty) period(s) established in the Subcontract Documents, and if no 
such period(s) be therein stipulated, then for a period of one (1) year from date of total project completion, Subcontractor 
agrees to promptly make good, solely at its expense, any work performed by Subcontractor which does not comply with 
requirements of the Subcontract Documents (including defective installation work and/or materials) and all damage and 
other losses resulting therefrom. • Subcontractor further agrees to provide, in writing, any guarantees, maintenance 
agreements or other documents related to the work above described required "by the Subcontract Documents. 
Subcontractor's responsibility for latent defects shall extend beyond the guarantee period to the maximum extent 
applicable statutes permit. 
*. INSURANCE AND DUTY TO DEFEND, INDEMNIFY & HOLD HARMLESS 
A. Certificates of Insurance. Prior to commencing its work on site and prior to receiving a payment otherwise due per this 
Agreement or a SWO, Subcontractor shall furnish and thereafter maintain certificates of insurance and indemnification 
evidencing compliance with (1) the indemnification provisions of Paragraph 3E, and (2) the insurance-related terms of 
this Agreement and the applicable SWO. Said certificates of insurance and the policies represented thereby shall not be 
cancelled or modified until thirty (30) days after written notice has been given to Contractor of such cancellation or 
modification. Required coverages shall be maintained without interruption from the date Subcontractor commences work 
under a SWO until at least the date of Subcontractor's receipt of final payment for the project. If the Subcontract 
Documents require all or part of Subcontractor's insurance coverage to remain in force after completion and/or final 
payment, a certificate evidencing continuation of such coverage shall be provided to Contractor prior to Subcontractor's 
being entitled to final payment or payment of retainage. 
B. Worker's Compensation Insurance. Subcontractor shall provide and maintain Worker's Compensation insurance at the 
levels required.by statute and Employer's Liability insurance with the following limits: (1) bodily injury by. accident, 
5100,000 each accident; (2) bodily injury by'disease, S100,000 each employee; and (3) bodily injury by disease, 
$500,000 policy limit. 
C: Liability Insurance. Subcontractor shall maintain such Commercial General Liability insurance, including automobile 
and blanket contractual liability, as will protect Subcontractor from claims for damage because of bodily injury, including 
death, or damage because of injury to or loss, destruction, or loss of use of propertyjwhich may arise from its operations 
under this Agreement or a related SWO, whether such operations be by Subcontractor or its subcontractors or anyone 
directly or indirectly employed by either of them. Subcontractor's liability insurance shall include Owner and Contractor 
as additional named insureds. Subcontractor's insurance shall provide the minimum limits of coverage set out in 
Paragraph IF of the SWO. Automobile Liability coverage shall be for all owned vehicles including non-owned, hired 
liability. Commercial General Liability coverage shall be written on an occurrence basis rather than on a claims-made 
basis. 
D. Builder's Risk Insurance and Waiver of Rights. Subcontractor shall satisfy itself as to the existence, coverage and 
deductibles of Builder's Risk, Property and/or Equipment insurance prior to commencement of its work on a project. 
Upon Subcontractor's written request, Contractor shall provide Subcontractor with a copy of the Builder's Risk insurance 
policy and any other Property or Equipment insurance in force for a project if said insurance has been procured by 
Contractor. Until final acceptance of a project by Owner, Subcontractor shall be responsible for (1) loss of or damage to 
its stored and installed materials, and (2) its pro rata share of any deductible amount associated with an otherwise insured 
loss. Contractor and Subcontractor waive all rights against each other and Owner, Architect, separate contractors, and 
other subcontractors for loss or damage to the extent said loss or damage is covered by Builder's Risk or any other 
Property or Equipment insurance, except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of such insurance. However, 
unless the Subcontract Documents otherwise provide, such waiver shall not extend to the acts of .Architect arising out of 
(1) the preparation or approval of maps, drawings, opinions, reports, surveys, change orders, designs or specifications or 
(2) the giving of or the failure to give directions or instructions provided such giving or failure to give is the primary 
cause of the loss or damage. If the policies of insurance referred to herein require an endorsement to provide for 
continued coverage where there is a waiver of subrogation, the owners of such policies will cause them to be so endorsed. 
E. Duty to Indemnify. Defend and Hold Harmless. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Subcontractor shall indemnify, 
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defend and hold harmless Contractor and Owner from and against any and all claims, demands, damages, liabilities, 
expenses and attorney fees (hereinafter collectively "loss") incurred by Contractor and/or Owner and arising out of, 
allegedly arising out of, or in any way related to the performance of Subcontractor's work (or failure to perform said 
work) includingbut not limited to: (1) loss incurred on account of any breach, or alleged breach, by Subcontractor of the 
obligations and covenants of this Agreement or a related SWO; (2) loss incurred for injuries to, or death of, persons 
including Contractor's employees, Subcontractor's employees and the employees of any other subcontractor, contractor, 
independent contractor, property owner or their lessees or assigns, and the heirs and personal representatives of such 
persons; (3) loss incurred arising from damage to real and/or personal property; (4) loss resulting directly or indirectly 
from use by Subcontractor of any tools, equipment, facilities, materials or employees of Contractor, whether with or 
without Contractor's knowledge or consentr(5)loss on account of the use of a bid depository or otherwise resulting from 
awarding this work to Subcontractor. Subcontractor's duty to indemnify and defend set out herein absolutely obligates 
Subcontractor to pay on behalf of Contractor and Owner all loss at such time as Contractor and/or Owner become legally 
obligated to pay such loss on account of claims of any kind being made against them arising from, allegedly arising from 
or in any way related to Subcontractor's performance or default under this Agreement or a related SWO including, but not 
limited to, damages, judgements, settlements, costs, expenses and attorney fees. Upon written request of Contractor in 
accordance with Subcontractor's obligations hereunder, Subcontractor shall further have the duty to defend and to pay all 
costs and expenses incidental to any suit, arbitration, mediation or proceeding against Contractor and/or Owner arising 
from, allegedly arising from or in any way related to, Subcontractor's performance or default under this Agreement or a 
related SWO solely at Subcontractor's expense without any right or claim to reimbursement from Contractor and/or 
Owner even if the allegations of the~su.it, arbitration, mediation, claim or proceeding prove to be groundless, false or 
fraudulent. This indemnification in favor of Contractor and Owner is intended to provide Contractor and Owner with the 
fullest indemnification permitted by law from any and ail losses whatsoever including, without limitations, attorneys' 
fees, costs and expenses, related to, resulting from, or arising out of this Agreement or a related SWO. 
F. No Limitation Upon Liability. In any claim against Contractor and/or Owner by any employee of Subcontractor, anyone 
directly or indirectly employed by Subcontractor, or anyone for whose acts Subcontractor may be liable, the 
indemnification, duty to defend and hold harmless obligations in this Agreement or a related SWO shall not be limited (1) 
by any limitation on the amount or type of damages, compensation or benefits payable by or for Subcontractor under 
worker's compensation, disability benefit or other employee benefit acts or regulations, or (2) to the policy limits of any 
insurance coverage which Subcontractor maintains or is required to maintain. 
G. Prime Contract Requirements. If the Prime Contract requires of subcontractors broader coverage, defense, 
indemnification, and/or hold harmless provisions; other named insureds; etc. than set out in this Article 3, then such 
coverage, indemnification, etc. shall be provided and maintained by Subcontractor at no additional cost to Contractor. 
4. PAYMENTS 
A. Cost Breakdown. Within thirty (30) days of the execution of the applicable SWO, Subcontractor shall submit for 
Contractor's review and approval a detailed, true cost breakdown of the contract amount sufficiently itemized as to work 
elements, labor, equipment, materials, etc. to allow Contractor to monitor Subcontractor's progress and to evaluate 
Subcontractor's periodic billings. Subcontractor's overhead and profit shall be distributed on a pro rata basis to each line 
item. The cost breakdown shall also include the estimated worker hours anticipated for each element of the work. An 
intentionally distorted or misrepresented cost breakdown shall be deemed to be fraudulent. 
B. Billings/Payments. Contractor shall make, on account of the contract amount (adjusted by any Change Authorizations,), 
monthly payments to Subcontractor for that portion of the work satisfactorily performed in the preceding month in 
accordance with monthly billings prepared by Subcontractor and as approved by Contractor, Architect and Owner As an 
absolute condition precedent to Subcontractor's being entitled to a particular payment, Contractor shall have received the 
corresponding periodic payment from Owner including the approved portion of Subcontractor's monthly billing. In the 
event Contractor does not receive from Subcontractor a proper and reasonable monthly billing prior to the date set forth 
in Paragraph ID of the SWO, Contractor may include in its monthly billing to Owner such amount as Contractor shall 
deem proper for the work of Subcontractor, and Subcontractor agrees to accept the approved portion thereof as its 
monthly payment 
C Payments Withheld. Payments otherwise due Subcontractor, including payment of retainage and final payment, may be 
withheld by Contractor on account of: (1) failure of Subcontractor to sign this Agreement or the applicable SWO, (2) 
failure of Guarantor(s) to sign this Agreement or the applicable SWO if required, (3) failure of Subcontractor to provide 
surety bonds \f required, (4) failure of Subcontractor to provide acceptabte and current certificates of insurance per 
Paragraph 3A, (5) failure of Subcontractor to provide an acceptable cost breakdown per Paragraph 4A, (6) failure of 
Subcontractor to complete Contractor's supplier affidavit and monthly lien release forms, (7) defective work of 
Subcontractor not remedied, (8) failure of Subcontractor to make payments owing to its employees, suppliers or 
subcontractors for material, services or labor, (9) claim(s) filed by or involving Subcontractor or reasonable evidence 
indicating the probability of such a claim being filed, (10) failure of Subcontractor to perform per a schedule or 
commitment made by Subcontractor, (11) failure of Subcontractor to perform per Contractor's schedule, or (12) a 
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reasonable doubt that Subcontractor can complete its work for the contract amount then unpaid. If any of the foregoing 
conditions exist and are not removed within three (3) days of Contractor's written notice to Subcontractor, Contractor 
may rectify the same at Subcontractor's expense. 
D Right to Offset/Joint Checks Contractor may offset against any sums due Subcontractor per this Agreement or a related 
SWO any amounts which are, in Contractors good faith opinion, owed to Contractor (or others) by Subcontractor, 
whether or not arising out of this Agreement or a related SWO and notwithstanding possible disputation by Subcontractor 
of Contractor's opinion If an offset is disputed, it shall be dealt with per Paragraph 7C. Contractor may also, when it 
deems proper m its sole discretion, issue joint checks to Subcontractor and Subcontractor's suppliers and subcontractors 
Contractor's options set out in this Paragraph 4D confer absolutely no enforceable rights upon any third party 
E Implied Acceptance Payment to Subcontractor pursuant to monthly or final billings shall not constitute or imply 
acceptance by Contractor, Architect or Owner of any portion of Subcontractor's work 
F Liens Subcontractor shall complete Contractor's monthly hen release and supplier affidavit forms Except for hens 
arising out of Owner's failure to pay Contractor and Contractor's resultant non-payment of Subcontractor, Subcontractor 
shall save and keep the project and improvements referred to in a SWO and the lands upon which they are situated free 
from all hens and encumbrances arismg out of its work, including, but not limited to, mechanic's and materialmen's hens 
If Subcontractor fails to remove any hen, by bonding xx otherwise, Contractor may retain sufficient funds out of any 
amounts due or thereafter to become due from Contractor to Subcontractor to pay the same and all costs incurred by 
reason thereof, and may pay said hen and costs out of any funds at any time in the hands of Contractor owing to 
Subcontractor 
G Final Payment and Retainage The percentage of Subcontractor's approved monthly billings set forth in Paragraph IE of 
the SWO and any other portion of the contract amount which is unpaid at the time of project completion shall be retained 
by Contractor and absolutely shall not be paid to Subcontractor until: (1) Contractor determines that none of the 
conditions set out in Paragraph 4C exist which would permit Contractor to withhold payment; (2) Contractor receives 
final project payment from Owner, (3) Architect and Owner accept Subcontractor's work, guarantees, etc , (4) 
Subcontractor furnishes Contractor with satisfactory evidence that all obligations incurred by Subcontractor pursuant to 
the applicable SWO have been paid in full; (5) Subcontractor furnishes Contractor with consent of Subcontractor's surety 
if any; (6) Subcontractor furnishes Contractor with consent of Guarantors if any, and (7) Subcontractor furnishes 
Contractor with certificates of insurance evidencing extension of insurance coverage beyond final payment if required 
(see Paragraph 3 A) 
5. CHANGES IN THE WORK/CHANGED CONDITIONS 
Contractor may add to or deduct from the work required by a SWO and any changes so made shall be defined by 
Contractor's written Change Authorization setting forth the changes involved and the value and time impact thereof, 
which value and time impact shall be mutually agreed upon between Contractor and Subcontractor and Owner if such be 
possible, and if such mutual agreement is not possible, then the value and time impact shall be determined as provided in 
Paragraph 7C of this Agreement In either event, Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as changed when so 
ordered in wntmg by Contractor so as not to delay the progress of the work and pending determination of the value 
thereof No claim for additional compensation, whether on account of extra labor and/or materials furnished, changed 
conditions, or otherwise, shall be paid unless the same is furnished pursuant to a written order signed by Contractor 
issued prior to the furnishing of the same Subcontractor shall provide Contractor with detailed pricing and tune 
extension information for a proposed change in the work within seven (7) days of receipt of information regarding said 
proposed change or within seven (7) days of receiving an instruction which Subcontractor believes constitutes a change -
whichever occurs first Subcontractor shall provide Contractor with detailed pricing and time extension information for 
alleged changed conditions within seven (7) days of encountering alleged changed conditions Subcontractor shall not 
be entitled to compensation or time extension for alleged changed conditions unless written claim for same is 
received by Contractor within said seven (7) day period. 
6. SUSPENSION/TERMINATION 
A Suspension Contractor may, for its convenience or by direction, suspend the work, either in whole or in part, at any time 
upon written notice to Subcontractor stating the nature, effective date and anticipated duration of such suspension 
whereupon Subcontractor shall suspend its work to the extent specified and shall place no further orders or perform no 
other work except as permitted by Contractor's notice of suspension During the period of such suspension 
Subcontractor shall protect and care for all work, materials and equipment at the project site or at storage areas under its 
responsibility The contract amount shall be adjusted as provided in Article 5 if the cost of the work is increased or 
decreased by Change Authorization as a result of such suspension If additional time for completion of the work is 
required as a result of such suspension, Subcontractor shall submit a written request for additional time m accordance 
with Articles 2 and 5 Failure to submit a timely written request for additional time due to such suspension shall result in 
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no extension of time being granted. 
3 . Termination for Convenience. In the event Contractor is directed by Owner to terminate all of its work prior to project 
completion, then an equitable settlement for work performed under this Agreement prior to such termination will be made 
as provided by the Subcontract Documents if such provision is made; or if none such exists, next by mutual agreement 
(which agreement may be to arbitrate or litigate or compromise and settle); or, failing either of these methods, then as 
provided in Paragraph 7C. In no event shall Subcontractor be entitled to prospective profits on unperformed work. 
C Termination for Cause. See Paragraph 2E. 
DISPUTES 
A. Scope of Prime Contract. In the event of a dispute between Contractor and Subcontractor with respect to whether the 
Prime Contract, including drawings and specifications, requires Contractor (and thus, perhaps, Subcontractor) to furnish 
any material or perform any labor, the decision of Architect shall be conclusive and binding. Should there be no architect 
over the work, then the matter in question shall be resolved per Paragraph 7C. 
B. Subcontractor's Scope/Costs. In the event of a dispute between Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope or costs 
of Subcontractor's work (e.g. whether Subcontractor is obligated to furnish certain items or to perform certain work 
clearly required of Contractor by the Prime Contract), the dispute shall be settled in the manner provided by the Prime 
Contract documents for settlement of such disputes. Should there be no manner of settlement so provided, the dispute 
shall be resolved per Paragraph 7C. 
C Methods of Resolution. If there arises a claim or dispute concerning matters in connection with this Agreement or a 
related S WO (for which dispute, provision for settlement is not otherwise made with the execution of the SWO), then the 
claimant shall mail or deliver written notice of the claim to the other party within the time limits provided in the Prime 
Contract or seven (7) days, whichever is shorter. Within thirty (30) days after mailing or delivery of the written notice of 
claim, the claimant shall mail or deliver to the other party a written summary of all principal facts relating to the claim 
and a detailed itemization, with substantiation, of the amount claimed. If Contractor is claimant, said 
summary/itemization shall also contain a written election by the Contractor to either (a) pursue the matter through civil 
litigation, or (b) submit the matter for binding arbitration. Said election shall bind both parties hereto. If Subcontractor 
is claimant, within forty-five (45) days after receipt by Contractor of said summary/itemization, Contractor shall give 
Subcontractor notice of Contractor's election to either litigate or arbitrate the matter. Said election shall bind both parties 
hereto. If the election is to litigate, each of the parties hereto irrevocably waives the right to a trial by jury in any and all 
actions or proceedings brought with respect to this Agreement and/or a related SWO or any provision thereof or the 
enforceability thereof. If the election is to arbitrate, the arbitration shall be in accordance with the Construction Industry 
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. No arbitration shall include by consolidation, joinder, or in any other 
manner, parties other than Contractor, Subcontractor and any other person or entity substantially involved in a common 
question of fact or law, whose presence is required if complete relief is to be accorded in the arbitration. The foregoing 
agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof. All 
arbitration proceedings and litigation shall take place within Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Subcontractor shall carry 
on its work and maintain its progress during any legal or arbitration proceedings. 
D. Recovery of Attorney Fees, Interest Etc. In the event it becomes necessary for either party to enforce the provisions of 
this Agreement or a related SWO or to obtain redress for the breach or violation of any provision hereof, whether by 
litigation, arbitration, or otherwise, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other party all costs and 
expenses associated with such action, including statutory interest and reasonable attorney fees except as limited herein. 
Where Subcontractor is determined to be the prevailing party, Subcontractor shall not be entitled to recover said costs 
and expenses (including attorney fees) if the final decision or judgment (excluding costs, expenses, attorney fees, and/or 
interest which are incurred after Subcontractor's receipt of Contractor's last written offer) is less favorable to 
Subcontractor than the last written offer of settlement from Contractor provided that said last written offer is made to 
Subcontractor at least ten (10) days prior to the commencement of arbitration hearings or trial. Subcontractor shall have 
five (5) days after receipt of such an offer to accept it in writing. 
8. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS 
A. Bonds. If payment and performance bonds are required by Paragraph 1G of the SWO, Subcontractor shall furnish to 
Contractor, at Subcontractor's expense, 100% payment and performance bonds guaranteeing the faithful performance of 
this Agreement and the payment of all labor and material bills incurred in the execution of the work covered by this 
Agreement and the applicable SWO. Notwithstanding any language to the contrary which may appear on the bonds 
themselves, said bonds shall automatically extend and apply to all work performed pursuant to Change Authorizations, to 
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Subcontractor's responsibility for actual and/or liquidated damages, tol to Subcontractor's guarantee/warranty 
obligations. Bonds shall be written by a surety company acceptable to Contractor and in a form satisfactory to 
Contractor. 
B Guarantors. If one or more Guarantors are required by Paragraph IH of the SWO, the Guarantors, in consideration of 
Contractor's entering into the SWO, agree to be jointly and severally responsible with Subcontractor for Subcontractor's 
performance of this Agreement and the SWO including Subcontractor's duty to Contractor and Owner to indemnify, 
defend and hold harmless per Paragraph 3E. The obligations of each Guarantor shall be identical to the obligations 
which a surety would have per Paragraph 8A. 
C. Subletting/Assignment. Subcontractor agrees not to transfer or sublet the work of a SWO or any part thereof without the 
prior written consent of Contractor. Subcontractor's right to moneys due hereunder is non-assignable except with the 
written consent of Contractor. Any assignment of moneys due hereunder made without such consent is void. 
D. Owner Approval/Contact. This Agreement and the SWO may be, per the Prime Contract, subject to approval of 
Subcontractor by Architect and/or Owner, Notwithstanding the above, unless Contractor provides written permission, 
Subcontractor shall have no direct dealings with Owner and shall not disclose to Owner any of the provisions or terms of 
this Agreement or die applicable SWO. 
E. Entire Agreement/Third Parties/Modifications, All verbal or written terms, conditions, proposals,. opinions, 
representations, negotiations and agreements made prior to the date of this Agreement are hereby expressly voided. This 
Agreement and separately executed SWO's shall be the sole agreements between the parties- They shall be binding 
upon the heirs, administrators, executors, successors and assigns of the parties hereto. Except as specifically prescribed 
herein, this Agreement and a SWO shall not create any rights of, or confer benefits upon, third parties. Except for routine 
Change Authorizations, no modification or change of the terms of this Agreement or a SWO shall be binding on 
Contractor unless approved in writing by an officer thereof 
F. Notice. Any notice required to be given to a party hereto shall be directed to such party and mailed by certified mail, or 
sent via electronic facsimile machine (fax), or personally delivered. Unless otherwise noted in this Agreement or the 
applicable SWO, such notice shall be effective at the time received at the street address indicated herein of such party. 
Notice received via fax after 5:00pm on a business day shall be effective at 9:00am on the next business day. Notice 
received via fa^ c before 9:00am on a business day shall be effective at 9:00am that same day. Notice received via fax on a 
holiday or weekend shall be effective at 9:00am on the first business day thereafter. 
G. Nonenforcement Not a Waiver. Failure on the part of either party to exercise its rights under the provisions of this 
Agreement or a SWO for any breach of the provisions therein by the other shall not constitute a waiver of such rights for 
any subsequent breach of any provision therein. 
H. Severability. Any provision of this Agreement or a SWO determined to be in violation of any law applicable thereto shall 
be void but that shall not affect the validity and enforceability of all other provisions therein. 
I. Governing Law. This Agreement and the applicable SWO shall be deemed to have been made in and shall be interpreted 
under the laws of the place where the project is located. 
BY 
TETON BUIL: 
Subcont 7Qf £-/O~0Z^ 
JACCteSEl/CQNSTRUCTIf 
Cotttrtactc 
MPANY, INC. 
Signature/Title/Date 
r^&^A - Xv-&\£^ M**-2^~ 
Distribution: White/Subcontractor, Yellow/Accounting 
Blue/Project Office, Green/Control 
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SUBCONTRACT WORK ORDER 
"SUBCONTRACTOR 
Teton Builders 
1200 Gregory Lane 
: Jackson, CVYS30QI 
Ph. (307) 733-1143 fax: (307) 733-2028 
PROJECT NAME 
Four Seasons - Jackson Hole, Wyoming 
DArE 
May 3, 2002 
JCC JOB NO " l 
01066 
. . . . . . | MSA NO. VvORK ORDEK ^C j 
01066-27 
GENT-.RAL DESCRIPTION OF WORJC TO SE PERfORMRD BV MJHCONTRACT0R ! 
-Rough Carpentry-
MASTER TERMS 
The terms and conditions of the Master Subcontract Agreement (MSA) dated 3rd of 
Juoe> 2001_ between Contractor and Subcontractor shall govern this Work Order and aie 
folly incorporated herein by reference. 
"Contractor" per the MSA is Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc., 3131 West 2210 S o u f t ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ I ^ r r ) 
841 !9. Subcontractor shall perform ihe work required by thi.s Subcontract Work Order in accordance with the 
following: j y N ) 0 2 0 0 2 
BASIC INFORMATION Jaooosei Construction 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D-
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
r. 
j . 
Project, 
Project LocaUun; __ 
Owner: . . 
Four Seasons Resort 
Jackson Hole. Wyoming 
PS Jackson Hole Development Company, LLC 
Architect (or Engineer): Hill-Glazier
 w_, , 
Contract amount1 One million one hundred four thousand nine hundred seventy six 
^Dollar* (J , LtQ4.976.00 
Addenda: • N/A . through and including, N/A 
Day of each month by which Subcontractor's monthly billing is to be received by Contractor: 20th 
Retainage: 10 % of Subcontractor's approved monthly billings 
Liability insurance minimum limits (See Paragraph 3C of MSA) 
Commercial General Liability, Occurrence and in the Aggregate $ LOOO.QQQ per occurrence 
S 2.000.000 aggre^at? 
Automobile Liability S 1,000,000 
Payment and performance bonds are (check one): 
Required (See Paragraph 8A of MSA) 
X _ ^ o t Required (Paragraph 8A of MSA does not apply to this Agreement) 
Guarantors) are (check one): 
X Required (See Paragraph 8B of MSA), Guarantors shall be: 
Not required (Paragraph 8B of MSA does not apply to this Work Order) 
Certified payrolls from Subcontractor are (check one): ^Required X _Nor required 
Shop drawings, etc. (check one): 
X Complete shop drawings, catalog cuLs, samples, etc. shall be submitted in JL copies with I 
reproducible of shop drawings 10 7650 Granite Loop Road. Teton village. Jackson. Wyoming 83025 
Project Site no later than as soon as possible. 
Rev 9/00 
Not required 
K. Drawings and specifications applicable hereto are (check one): 
M Listed in the Subcontract Documents 
X Listed in Exhibit 'LC* attached hereto 
L. Jacobsen information 
Project No, 0166 Code ^ 06100-5 
Contractor's License No./State N/A - Wyoming 
Mailing Address 7650 Granite Loop Road. Tetofl Village. Jackson. WY 83025 _ 
Street Address same as above
 a . ^ ^.^ 
Phones; Office 307-734-7157 Office fax 307-739-2123 Project 307-734-0533 
E-mail Address: to be provided 
M. Subcontractor information 
Organization (check one): Corporation X Partnership ^ 
Individual Joint Venture 
Federal Tax Identification No, Contact Person Tom Hunter 
Status: Small Business FBE MBE. . 
Contractor's License No./State N/A - Wyoming 
Phone*' Office H ( m 733-1143 Office Fax: (301) 733-2028 E-mail Address:, 
N. Clean-up and trash removal 
Subcontractor is responsible for regular and prompt clean up of all debris and rubbish occasioned by its 
work. Subcontractor shall transport all such debris and rubbish to (check one): 
An off-site disposal site selected and paid for by Subcontractor. 
Contractor's on-site dumpster. Subcontractor shall pay its pro rata share of the costs of the 
dumpster and dump fees. 
t X Contractor's on-site dumpster. Contractor shall pay the COSTS of the dumpster and dump fees 
In addition, Contractor may periodically organize a general project clean-up. If Subcontractor is then 
working on site, Subcontractor shall provide its pro rata share of labor to assist in said clean-up 
Z, SPECIFIC SCOPE O F W O R K 
Perform all work required by and in accordance with the Subcontract Documents which include but arc not necessarily 
limited to the Drawings titled %Tour Seasons Resort Jackson Hole, Wyoming", prepared by Hill glazier Aichitects, 
particularly General Conditions, Supplementary General Conditions and Specification Sections: 
Division I —General Requirements 
Sections - All (As they relate to the performance of this Subcontract) 
Specification Sections 
06070 - Wood Treatment (As it relates to the performance of this Subcontract) 
06100 - Rough Carpentry 
06101 - Miscellaneous Carpentry (As it relates to the performance of this Subcontract) 
06170 - Prefabricated Structural Wood 
06192 -Prefabricated Structural Wood Trusses 
A. Subcontractor ' s scope of work Includes, bu t is not limited to the following i tems: 
1. The word '"provide" is intended to be inclusive to furnish, fabricate, receive, unload, store, install, erscc, 
etc. such that the material or system is complete and operational and is in its permanent location (eady 
to be accepted and used by the Owner. 
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2. Subcontractor shall he aware that the Owner is expecting the finished project to be high quality in 
appearance, workmanship, durability, and other such considerations. Subcontractor shall use such 
measures as to obtain the desired outcome. 
3. Provide coordination with other subcontractors whose work abuts the work contained herein. 
4 Provide all labor, materials, equipment and fasteners for rough framing of the Condominium Structure 
- Area 06. It ib the intent of this work scope to provide all rough carpentry labor and materials as 
required to successfully complete the 4-way inspection. 
5 Provide species and grade of lumber as identified in the construciion documents, Drywall finishes will 
require a Level 05 Finish and the rough carpentry scope of work will be a factor in achieving this level 
of finish. 
6. Supply all marerials for a complete installation including, dimensional lumber, sheathing, glue-
laminated beams, parallam beams, "V* joists, micro lam, rim boards, timbers, etc. for a complete 
installation. 
7. Provide all hoisting required for the installation and erection of all rough carpentry work, inclusive of 
fork lifts as required 
8. Supply and install ail nails, glue, hardware, specialty hardware, etc., for the rough carpentry scope of 
work, as required by local codes and as indicated on the Contract Documents including inclusive of 
Simpson hangers, straps* hum cane clips7 clips, saddles, etc. 
9 Provide all framing associated with the stair* including treads and risers. Finished wood treads and 
balustrades will be provided and installed by others. 
10, Provide installation of the exterior deck structures. Finished decking is by others. 
11 Provide cleanup of structure on a regular basis. Deposit debris and waste materials in the Construction 
Manager provided dumpstcr. 
12, The rough carpentry scope of work is inclusive of the structural framing and includes the installation oi 
exterior and interior wood framed walls, wall sheathing, floor joists, floor sheathing, roof trusses, stick 
built roof systems, roof overbuilds, roof sheathing, blocking, fascias, curved roof edges, structural 
timbers, timber trusses, plates, headers, beams, biair construction, attic access installation, draft stops, 
etc 
1 3 Provide the framing as required for the construction of the chimneys; refer to details AB-8.2 1 1 8, AB-
8 2 U 8 A , a n d AB-3 2 118B. 
14 install board and batten siding, trim materials, and exterior building paper at the shared wall on grid 158 
and 160 between grid 135 and - I 117 refer to elevation 14onA5. l0 . Refer to details on AB 8.4 33 for 
the installation requirements of siding materials. 
1 5 Install the through wall flashing material inclusive of all blocking materials; refer to details 2/AB-
8A54 , l/AB-8.4,56, 1/AB-8A56, 
16, The cost of the roof trusses is noted as a cash allowance below and will be adjusted based on the fina 
cost from the supplier. Overhead and profit for this line item is included in the overall contract amount 
and shall not be added to this line item. 
17 The bridge connecting area 04 and area 06/will be coordinated with Teton Ruiiders erection schedule 
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Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. 
JACKSON FOUR SEASONS PROJECT 
Attachment D to Work Order # 01066-27 
1. Teton Builders schedule requirements are predicated upon material delivery 
dates. The erection schedule will be based upon original building durations 
provided at time of bid, but will begin upon material delivery dates. 
2. Jacobsen agrees to hold erection of the bridge between areas 4 and 6 until a 
mutually agreeable time that will allow Teton Builders access to their work area. 
3. Material delivered off site and paid for with project funds will become the property 
of the owner. Off site stored materials will be paid for with the following 
conditions: 
a. Teton Builders to provide an affidavit stating that all materials were 
purchased for the sole purpose of use on the Four Seasons resort and will 
not be used for any other purpose. 
b. Teton Builders will provide a certificate of insurance on the stored 
materials. 
c. Fee will not be assessed on stored materials. Fee may only be charged 
against materials on site. 
d. Copies of purchase agreements, invoices and delivery tickets must be 
provided to Jacobsen Construction. 
4. The cash allowance of $75,000 for roof trusses includes all delivery fees, taxes, 
and transportation costs, F.O.B. jobsite, 
5. This SWO applies only to Area 6 of the Four Seasons Resort. 
6. Jacobsen shall provide level 6 Top of Concrete elevations and Grid lines. 
7. Gypsum board is by others. 
8 Jacobsen Construction shall make provide assistance with cranes on a limited 
basis. Crane time must be coordinated with Jacobsep a minimum of 24 hours 
prior. 
VV 1 ^ 
B. The Contract amoun t was derived as follows: 
Base Bid 
Proposal Dated April 26, 2002 
Rough Carpeiwy Materials $ - 379,804 
Roof Trusses (Allowance) $ 75,000 
Wood I Joists S 55,288 
Glue Lams $ 42,612 
LVL's or Parallam Beams S 26,974 
Hardware S 42,658 
Rough Carpentry Labor $ 472,640 
Labor to install siding at shared wall S 10.000 
Total Contrac t Amount SI ,104£1& 
C. The following items will be provided by others: 
1. One set of the construction drawings and project manual as prepared by Hill Glazier Architects 
Subcontractor will be required to purchase any additional sets of drawings and project manuals needed 
to perform its scope of work. 
2. Others will provide embedded anchor bolts in concrete foundations. 
j Wood To steel specialty connectors at the moment frames will be provided by others 
4 Others will supply the board and batten siding, trim, and waterproof membrane at the shared wall on 
grid 158 and 160 between grid 135 and -i 11, refer to elevation 14 on A5.10 Co-ordination accepting 
offloading and distribution to the final installation shall be by Seoul Enterprises 
5 Others will supply the through wall flashing material 
6 Exterior Timbers, siding, fascia boaids, and trim as noted on the architectural drawings 
7 Others will perform installation of doors and windows. 
3. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS 
1. The amount of any additive change order (Change Authorization) to the Contract Amount will be limited to 
the actual, direct cost to the Subcontractor of making that change plu<> a combined total of fifteen percent 
(15%) of such actual cost of the Subcontractor's overhead and profit. 
2 Subcontractor shall use reasonable efforts to avoid labor disputes that could hamper or delay the completion 
of the work. Whether or not resulting from Subcontractor's failure to use reasonable efforts to avoid same, 
in no event shall a labor dispute (other than an industry-wide/regional labor problem) give nse to a claim by 
Subcontractor for an increase m the Contract Amount. 
3. Subcontractor shall furnish to any and all lenders providing funds for the construction or permanent 
financing of the Project with such documents, instruments and certificates as may reasonably be required by 
lenders in a form acceptable to lenders with respect to the construction of the Project and the payment of the 
costs thereof 
4, Subcontractor shall bear the cost (wUhour reimbursement) resulting from the act or omission, or the fault or 
negligence or failure to fulfill a specific responsibility of the Subcontractor and its agents or employees, or 
anyone directly or indirectly employed by them or for whose acts any of them may be liable including but 
not hmxted to costs for the correction of damaged, defective or nonconforming work, disposal and 
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replacement of materials and equipment incorrectly ordered of supplied, and making good damage to 
property not forming part of the work-
5. in the event that the Contractor defaults under this Subcontract Work Order of the applicable Master 
Subcontract Agreement or in the event that the Contractor is replaced by the Owner or the Owner's 
construction lender as the Contractor for the project covered by this Subconrract Work'Order, at the request 
and option of the Owner or the Owner's construction lender, Subcontractor will perform under and in 
accordance with the terms of this Subcontract Work Order and applicable Master Subcontract Agreement 
for any replacement Contractor. None of these provisions shall be construed to impose on Owner or the 
Owner's construction lender any obligation with respect to the Subcontractor whatsoever. 
6. This Subcontract Work Order and Subcontractor bonds, if any, may be assigned to Owner and/or the lender, 
in their sole discretion, in the event of the termination of the contract between the Owner and Contractor. 
7. Unless otherwise required by the Contract Documents, the form of warranty shown in Exhibit "A" shall be 
used on this Project. 
8. Subcontractor shall connect and coordinate the Subcontractor's construction and operations with the 
Owner's FF&E contractors as required by the contract documents. 
9. Contractor shall nor be obligated to make payment to Subcontractor with respect to any Application for 
Payment unless: 
a. Subcontractor delivers to Contractor concurrently with such Application for Payment, 
conditional or unconditional, as applicable, lien waivers and releases in form substantially 
similar to the forms attached hereto as Exhibit ^B", and 
b, Subcontractor shall provide Contractor with reasonable evidence that Subcontractor has 
complied with the following conditions to payment: 
i, Subcontractor has attached to such lien waiver a full and complete list of the names and addresses of 
all Subcontractors, Sub-subcontractors, material suppliers (and their respective Subcontractors, Sub-
subcontractors and material suppliers) (collectively, the ^Subs77) which Subcontractor or any ot the-
Subs has hired to perform any portion of the Work or to provide any of the materials or equipment to be 
used in connection with performing any portion of the Work (the "'List of Subs"), 
it. Subcontractor has included a provision in each Subcontract and purchase order pertaining to the 
Work and/or the Project which requires each of the Subs to notify Subcontractor of the names and 
addresses of each of the Subs they have hired to perform any portion of the Work or to provide any of 
the materials or equipment to be used in connection with performing any portion of the Work and 
Subcontractor has incorporated ihe information so provided by each of the Subs into its List of Subs, 
iii. Subcontractor has paid all of the Subs for all work performed and materials and equipment 
provided (both on-site and off-site), except as expressly noted to the contrary, 
iv. Subcontractor has required each of the Subs to provide conditional mechanic's lien waivers and 
releases, in form and substance satisfactory to Contractor, Owner and Lenders, relating to that portion 
of the Work for which the Application for Payment (to which the lien waiver and certification ib 
attached) is being submitted and each of the Subs' conditional lien waivers are attached to 
Subcontractor's hen waiver, and 
v. Subcontractor has required each of the Subs to provide unconditional mechanic's lien waivers and 
releases, in form and substance satisfactory to Contractor, Owner and Lenders, relating to that portion 
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of the Work for which all prior progress payments were received and each of che Sub's unconditional 
lien waivers are attached to'Contractor's Hen waiver. 
10. Subcontractor understands and acknowledges that, while this subcontract will be construed pursuant to the 
laws of Wyoming, the underlying contract between the Contractor and the Owner is governed instead by 
the laws of California and includes specific provisions for the resolution of disputes in that state. 
Subcontractor may, bur is not required to, appear and participate to the extent allowed by California law in 
any dispute between Jacobsen and the Owner that involves the performance of, or amounts due to 
Subcontractor, Recognizing that the underlying contract governed by the laws of California, Subcontractor 
agrees to accept and be bound by the final resolution of any such dispute whether or not Subcontractor 
eleccs to participate therein. 
1 i. All policies of insurance required under the terms of this Subcontract Work Order and Master Subcontract 
Agreement shall name Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc., FS Jackson Hole Development Company, 
LLC, Louis Dreyfus Properties, LLC, Louis Dreyfus Property Group, Inc., Four Seasons HoteU and 
Resorts, Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, The Robert Green Company and their respective members, 
managers, partners, officers, directors, affiliates, agents, independent contractors, employees, successors 
and assignees as additional insureds using ISO additional insured endorsement CG 20 10 or a substitute 
providing equivalent coverage and shall contain a waiver of subrogation in favorof Owner, Owner's lender, 
The Robert Green Company and their respective members, managers, partners, directors, officers, affiliates, 
agents, independent contractors, emptoyees, successors and assignees. In addition, all such policies shall be 
primary and non-contributing and shall contain an agreement on the part of the insurers that in the event ot 
cancellation of the policy, or a reduction as to coverage or limits thereunder, whether initiated by the insurer 
or arty insured, the insurer shall give not less than thirty (30) days advance written notice by registered or 
certified mail to Owner and Contractor. 
12. The Subcontractor shall be required ro provide adequate forces to meet the schedule. The subcontractor 
will be required to provide labor as required and shall be responsible for costs associated with working 
beyond a standard 40 hour work week, if required. Subcontractors shall provide adequate materials and 
crew to maintain schedule. Subcontractor shall be responsible for damages due to schedule delay 
attributable to the Subcontractor. The Owner will assess liquidated Damages if the entire project is not 
completed on schedule. Subcontractor's portion of the liquidated damages, if assessed, will be 
commensurate to the degree in which it caused the delay to the project. 
13. Subcontractor shall schedule delivery of construction materials to avoid peak traffic periods, Peak traffic 
periods are between the hours of 8:30a.m. - 9:30 a.m. and between 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p,m 
14. On site parking will be limited, therefore van-pooling or car-pooling will be required by the Subcontractors 
performing work on the site* Construction parking will be prohibited in the Village common lots, or in the 
sunounding neighborhoods. Parking will be permitted at Stilson Ranch Lot/ US 22 and Wyoming 390 
Shuttle to and from the site will be provided by the Contractor, 
15. This work will b<* phased. Subcontractor shall conform to the construction-phasing schedule as outlined in 
the Construction Documents. Owner will occupy portions of the building during the construction period, as 
outlined in the documents. 
16. Subcontractor shall verify dimensions as shown on the Drawings and field verify as required to insure 
proper performance of its work. Subcontractor shall be responsible for all coring, cutting, patching, sealing, 
caulking and finishing necessary to complete its work. Subcontractor shall protect nearby landscaping, 
equipment, and finishes from damage caused by its operations. Any damaged areas shall be repaired or 
replaced as directed by the Contractor at Subcontractors expense, 
17 The Subcontractor shall provide the following prior to Substantial Completion: 
i. Two sets of as built drawings. 
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ii. Two framed valve charts listing each valve by number, system and function. 
18. Three months prior to substantial completion the Contractor will provide the following to the Owner, 
therefore the Subcontractor shall provide the following in a timely matter to the Contractor for submission, 
ill. Two sets of operating and maintenance manuals for all mechanical and electrical equipment 
iv. Two sets of manufacturers recommended maintenance procedures for all architectural and 
interior design materials. 
19 All personnel of the subcontractor, which will be performing work on the site, shall attend an orientation 
meeting organized by the contractor's on site personnel prior to performing work on the site. 
Jacobsen Obstruction Compan^Jnc. 
Contiactc 
^S&u^ JL\ 
.*W*c££ £~ 
istributioTi: White/Subcontractor, Yellow/Accounting 
lue/Project Office, Green/Control 
Teton Builders 
Subcontract*) 
/fas. 6-/O~CZL-
Signature/Title/Date 
Guarantor p£f faragr^fs 1H and 8B of MS A 
S ignaturc/Tit le/Date 
.£sl* -C<L 
Guarantor's Address of Record. 
Guarantor per Paragraphs 1H and 8B ot MSA 
By: 
Signature/Title/Date 
Guarantor's Address of Record: 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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MOTION TO DISMISS AUGUST 8,2003 
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CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
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For the Plaintiff: MATTHEW J. BALL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
For the Defendant: ERIK A. OLSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 8, 2003 
2 HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: This is Teton Builders and Thomas Hunter, 
5 case number 030905324. Counsel, please state appearances. 
6 MR. OLSON: Good morning, Your Honor, Erik Olson for 
7 the defendants. 
8 MR. BALL: Your Honor, Matt Ball for Jacobsen 
9 Construction Company and this is Richard Kirkham, the Chief 
10 Financial Officer of Jacobsen Construction. 
11 THE COURT: Good morning. 
12 Okay. We are here on the Defendant's Motion to 
13 Dismiss based on, I guess it's lack of jurisdiction and the 
14 main defense is the contract, the form selection clause. Sort 
15 J of enjoyable reading your memoranda. I read them very 
16 carefully, as well as the, mainly the Phone Directories case 
17 and I have to say I, I just wondered if this is a continuation 
18 of the battle between you two officers to style new phone 
19 directories, at least the names in there look very familiar. 
20 But that's been going on for, but it also explained to me why 
21 you knew it so well. I should say you really carved that case 
22 up and I understand why you did, but it's certainly an 
23 illustration of why it's so hard to deal with those fractioned 
24 decisions. I did find that frustrating in a way. I know the 
25 I Court gives you all the guidance it can, but when you got to 
1 start pausing them the way you do that in that phone 
2 directories case to figure out what the priority or majority 
3 is, it gets difficult to say the least. But I think on the, 
4 the motion, and it's your motion if I'm reading correctly, Mr. 
5 Ball? 
6 MR. BALL: No, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: No, I'm reversing it? I do that a lot. 
8 MR. OLSON: It's, right, it's mine. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. I don't know what it is about this 
10 case. I had reversed the firms for some reason. I know the 
11 parties. My apologies on that. 
12 On your motion, Mr. Olson, you don't spend a lot of 
13 time initially on the, on the basic jurisdiction issues and 
14 this is not a general jurisdiction. This would have to be 
15 minimum contacts nexus case. But when Mr. Ball makes his point 
16 that, you know, this doesn't really count because of the 
17 contract, you do come back and analyze that. But I think this 
18 contract is just absolutely critical and, of course, it is the 
19 choice of law is critical, and it's sort of interesting to me 
20 as we try to apply Wyoming law, but we keep coming back to Utah 
21 law to interpret Wyoming law, particularly on the issue of 
22 whether the form selection clause is unreasonable. But I'll 
23 tell you, I'm leaning that the form selection clause is enough. 
24 But I'm by no means all the way there, and that's partly 
25 because of the language of their long arm and the interest of 
1 the State in exerting jurisdiction as far as the constitution, 
2 due process clause permits, and one question I have is why 
3 doesn't due process, why isn't it satisfied if someone makes a 
4 decision, even in something as limited as a form selection 
5 clause, even without a consent to jurisdiction? And boy when 
6 you guys start dividing form selection and consent to 
7 jurisdiction, I really think we're slicing it thin, but I 
8 understand the legal argument, and I respect the schooling 
9 role. But why doesn't that deal with the constitutional 
10 concern? 
11 And the other concern is essentially the relationship 
12 that's argued between the parties and all subject matter that 
13 must exist, because the form selection clause alone is not 
14 enough as Justice Durham said. I think it's, your argument 
15 says it'd have to be both parties, Mr. Olson, the way the 
16 language reads. It says parties in the plural, correct, that's 
17 one point you made? 
18 MR. OLSON: Sort of. I can explain that a little. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah, and I'm just giving you this 
20 background so that you can focus on the things that are 
21 concerning me. 
22 I'm not sure that that's very persuasive because if 
23 it was both parties, in all cases, you wouldn't often have much 
24 of a dispute over form to start with. Probably wouldn't want 
25 to be here in the first place, or there, wherever it is. So, I 
1 think it's reasonable to read it as either the subject matter 
2 or one of the parties to the contrary. 
3 The other thing, finally, that's not all that you 
4 want to argue I'm sure, but on issue of Wyoming law, in terms 
5 of construing whether it's form selection or consent to 
6 jurisdiction in a contract under Wyoming law do you still need 
7 minimum contacts? I think the closest analysis I saw was 
8 people are stuck with the contract. I don't know if that's all 
9 the Wyoming law on that topic, but I suspect it is, which is 
10 why I thought I saw, or maybe I missed it as it got to be about 
11 11:00 last night. I hope I didn't. 
12 Before we start, Mr. Peterson, you have the whole 
13 9:00 calendar. I'm hearing an argument on a jurisdiction 
14 matter. I will not be disturbed at all if you call people and 
15 move around and deal with them. So -
16 MR. PETERSON: Thank you very much. 
17 THE COURT: - please don't hesitate, okay? Thank you. 
18 Go ahead Mr. Olson. 
19 MR. OLSON: Thanks, Your Honor, it sounds like I have 
20 an up hill battle. But I'm confident that I'll be able to 
21 resolve the Court's concern -
22 THE COURT: It's always interesting and I don't know 
23 I if you do or not, but, I mean, yeah you do, but it's so well 
24 presented on both sides, I'm looking forward to your argument. 
25 MR. OLSON: I appreciate that, thanks, Your Honor. 
1 What I would first like to do is explain what Utah 
2 law says. There's been some confusion about that. I did 
3 participate in, in the Phone Directories case. I can't say I 
4 fully understand the Supreme Court's decision, and all of the, 
5 all of the different opinions that were handed down in that 
6 case, but I would like to go through that case and go through 
7 some of the other standards that Utah has set forth in this 
8 type of case. When we look at these standards, it is certain 
9 that there is no jurisdiction in this case and I'll explain 
10 that. The Court's already started with the general proposition 
11 that, that we know is the case, that in Utah to establish 
12 personal jurisdiction you have to go through the traditional 
13 minimum contacts analysis. 
14 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
15 MR. OLSON: Consistent with the due process clause and 
16 the State long arm statute. We are only aware of one Utah 
17 case, and it's the Phone Directories, Henderson case that 
18 create any sort of exception to that traditional minimum 
19 contacts analysis and that's what it is. It is an exception to 
20 the standard rule. In Phone Directories we have this rational 
21 nexus test that applies when there is a consent to jurisdiction 
22 clause. 
23 Now it, it has to be pointed out that based on the 
24 I concurrences in that case, the exception to the minimum 
25 contacts analysis does not extend, explicitly at least, by that 
1 opinion to form selection clauses. Based on Justice Howe's 
2 concurrence where he stated that the enforceability of a form 
3 I selection clause is still governed by other rulings that the 
4 Supreme Court has handed down, which had nothing to do with 
5 personal jurisdiction, this Court cannot extend Henderson to a 
6 form selection clause. The Court in, in Henderson certainly 
7 drew a distinction between form selection clauses and consent 
8 to jurisdiction clauses. I understand that the lead opinion 
9 did not. But that lead opinion is just a plurality opinion 
10 based on this concurrence. 
11 THE COURT: In the statute, given the status of the 
12 law in this state, I mean, the way you're presenting this case, 
13 or the fact that this feels like first impression when you come 
14 right down to it, and our best direction is Phone Directories 
15 and Wyoming law to the extent that you can find some. Is that 
16 a fair statement? 
17 MR. OLSON: I don't think so. I don't think it's 
18 necessarily a case of first impression. I guess, I guess the 
19 J Court is correct in stating that no reported Utah decision has 
20 ever had the same facts as this case. 
21 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. 
22 [over talking] 
23 MR. OLSON: So, yeah, I guess that's, the fact that 
24 makes it a case of first impression, then I think the Court is 
25 J correct there. Are there standards in Utah that govern this 
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case? Yes. That's why we think it's not a case of first 
impression. But there is Utah law that governs here. 
Based on the concurrences in the Phone Directories 
case, where Justice Howe comes back and says no, the form 
selection clauses are governed by the Prows case we have to go 
back to the Prows case and figure out whether the Prows case 
enacted some sort of exception to the minimum contacts 
analysis. We know that it didn't. In Prows the Court was 
looking at venue and that is the distinction that we're drawing 
here. Consent to jurisdiction clauses are agreements as to 
personal jurisdiction. Form selection clauses are agreements 
as to venue. They're completely separate issues. 
THE COURT: [inaudible] that distinction. Now I mean 
you agree to venue, but without jurisdiction isn't venue 
meaningless? It, I mean when we're outside, when we're going 
from state to state. I can see if someone is going to a venue 
different within a state, which wouldn't have anything to do 
with an interstate agreement. But how does that help? 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, we don't know what the 
parties, we don't know what the parties proposed and perhaps 
rejected in that case. That evidence is not before the court. 
We have no way of saying with any certainty that, that Jacobsen 
didn't propose consent to jurisdiction clause to the defendants 
and that was rejected. We have no way of saying that did or 
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1 didn't happen -
2 THE COURT: But this involves -
3 MR. OLSON: We're stuck with -
4 THE COURT: [inaudible] let's suppose they did and 
5 jurisdiction was rejected, venue was accepted. How could you 
6 ever in fact trigger and use the venue if you don't have 
7 jurisdiction? (inaudible). I mean I may be missing something. 
8 I just don't see how you can have venue here if you can't get 
9 the body here. 
10 MR. OLSON: I understand that. I understand that. 
11 THE COURT: And that's one of the underlying concerns 
12 I have here, whether this form selection clause has any meaning 
13 and we go back. One thing our Supreme Court is pretty clear on 
14 is people take the contract they write. And there are 
15 exceptions and [inaudible] a question of ambiguity and beyond. 
16 But if it's not ambiguous, it's only going to be bound by what 
17 they did unless it's a policy or statute as it was, is that 
18 statute in Utah law. But again, I'm not sure that applies 
19 here. You see my problem? Is it really meaningless? 
20 MR. OLSON: I don't think it's meaningless. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. OLSON: There could have been facts after they 
23 negotiate, or there could have been events that took place 
24 after they negotiated that contract that would have given them 
25 jurisdiction in Utah. None of those events have come to pass. 
1 THE COURT: - venue and then they would have found 
2 their jurisdiction through contacts or some other effect. 
3 MR. OLSON: Absolutely. 
4 THE COURT: And that would be the main one. 
5 MR. OLSON: Absolutely. The bottom line is, yes, 
6 court's hold parties to the terms of their contracts and their 
7 not -
8 THE COURT: I was thinking in terms of how this is 
9 presented in the, in the light of where we are today, that 
10 would appear not be giving them the ability to bring up here. 
11 But there could be circumstances, I understand. 
12 MR. OLSON: There could, and, and this contract was 
13 signed a few years ago. We don't know what was going through 
14 the parties mind at the time. All we, all we know is what, 
15 what we have in front of us in this contract, and there is no -
16 THE COURT: There's no boilerplate. They did 
17 negotiate a place of litigation. They also negotiated a law 
18 and they were two different things to control. So they were 
19 talking and negotiating. 
20 MR. OLSON: That's correct. That's correct. 
21 I would say, Your Honor, that Utah courts have drawn 
22 a distinction between the two types of provisions. In 
23 Henderson, for example, Justice Durham very easily could have 
24 responded to Justice Howe in her lead opinion by pointing out 
25 that it doesn't matter what he says about a form selection 
1 clause, because they're essentially the same thing. Form 
2 selection clause is essentially a consent to jurisdiction, so 
3 let's focus on the consent to jurisdiction analysis and 
4 everything else about form selection clauses is meaningless. 
5 THE COURT: I agree with you they're not the same 
6 thing. But there is some overlap I believe and my question I 
7 guess is can you have some implied consent in a forum selection 
8 and then you express consent in a consent jurisdiction where if 
9 you've got consent to jurisdiction you need nothing more. If 
10 you have a forum selection with an implied consent, you may 
11 need more like the rational nexus. I mean is that a fair 
12 I distinction? 
13 MR. OLSON: Some cases have gone that way. As we've 
14 pointed out in our, in our memoranda, Jacobsen's directed the 
15 court to some cases from other jurisdictions that have gone 
16 that way, that have found implied consent. I haven't taken any 
17 effort to distinguish those cases, because that's what those 
18 I cases hold. There are also cases, as I've cited, in other 
19 states that stand for the opposite view, that point out that 
20 there is no overlap. Rather, that a consent to jurisdiction 
21 clause is a consent to jurisdiction, while a forum selection 
22 clause is merely a stipulation as to venue. So other courts 
23 have drawn that distinction. 
24 I THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
25 I MR. OLSON: Utah courts, well we're stuck with what 
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Utah says. We're stuck with what the Utah Supreme Court has 
handed us and in Utah the courts have drawn a distinction 
between the two. The courts have never pointed out that there's 
any overlap between the two and again, based on Justice 
Durham's failure to respond in any way to Justice Howe's 
concurrence regarding the separation between the two and the 
different analysis that applies to the two, we don't see any 
way that the court can find there's some sort of confluence 
between the two types of provisions. 
We would argue, Your Honor, taking it a step further 
and I would like to, you know, I could spend all day talking 
about this Henderson case and it might not get us anywhere. 
What I would like to do is proceed to some of the Court's 
concerns with respect to what the Henderson standard is and how 
we square ourselves under that. Even if the Court is to 
determine that Henderson applies, that there is some sort of 
implied consent to jurisdiction, and again we dispute that and 
I've explained that already, even if we're to buy into 
Jacobsen's argument that there was an implied consent to 
personal jurisdiction and that Henderson applies, we still have 
to satisfy this Henderson rational nexus test. The Court has 
correctly stated the test. There has to be a -rational nexus 
between this state and either the parties to, either the 
parties to or the subject matter of the contract. In Henderson 
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1 there were both. Not only was there a connection between both 
2 parties to Utah. But there was also a connection between the 
3 subject matter of the contract and Utah and perhaps that's what 
4 the Court is missing, and, you know, it's stating, Your Honor, 
5 stating the concern that, you know, maybe we just need either 
6 of the parties, because you know we may never have a case where 
7 we've got both defendants that are residents of the State of 
8 Utah, then there would really be no meaning to, to this test. 
9 But that's not what the standard is 
10 THE COURT: - there'd be no meaning. I mean it 
11 would be such an easy decision there -
12 MR. OLSON: Correct. 
13 THE COURT: - in fact, probably if you had both 
14 parties to resident here they wouldn't be contesting it is 
15 really what I'm saying. They'd be happy to be here, it's 
16 convenient. In most cases you're only going to have one, and 
17 of course what we're trying to avoid is the remote forum to 
18 both. I think that's one reason we have the rational nexus 
19 test. I mean we've got Wyoming and Utah, we don't want a 
20 Delaware forum, and that wouldn't make a lot of sense to any of 
21 us. People might do it, they might do it just to be difficult. 
22 I mean we, I think we've all seen contracts stranger than that. 
23 But that's really what I'm asking, why does it need to be both 
24 and most cases where they are both, I don't think you'd have an 
25 I issue there, I guess what I'm saying. 
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MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I don't think it's just a 
matter of convenience. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. OLSON: I don't think that the rational nexus test 
is merely limited to preventing inconvenience to the parties. 
It goes a lot further than that. The court certainly didn't 
state that in the Henderson case. When you look at Henderson -
and this is what's important - there was a connection to Utah 
for both parties. The defendant in that case, he was a 
resident of California, but he telephoned the plaintiff's 
office in Utah to request employment. The very employment 
contract at issue he signed at the Utah office of plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. OLSON: He telephoned the office to continue 
negotiating the contract. Once it was finally complete and he 
had a copy of it, he then mailed it to the Utah office. So the 
defendant in that case, had a connection with Utah just as the 
plaintiff Phone Directories is a Utah corporation with its 
principle place of business in Utah. 
Here we do not have that. We have no connection 
whatsoever between the defendants and the plaintiff and that is 
the distinction between Phone Directories and it would be a 
major leap of faith to extend Phone Directories to this case 
and then find that under Phone Directories we have this 
13 
1 connection with both parties. Here we've got Mr. Hunter and 
2 his company, the two defendants, they have absolutely no 
3 contact with Utah. We've submitted -
4 THE COURT: That's absolutely accepted for this 
5 argument. 
6 MR. OLSON: Yeah, that hasn't been disputed so far in 
7 this case. We've submitted an affidavit and there hasn't been 
8 any, any contrary evidence provided. But based on those 
9 contacts, there are none, there's no basis for this Court 
10 extending personal jurisdiction in this case. You can't say 
11 that just because one party has a connection to Utah we have a 
12 rational nexus between either the parties to or the subject 
13 matter of the contract. 
14 THE COURT: Well, what's it mean to have a rational 
15 nexus to a party? 
16 MR. OLSON: There has to be some connection to that 
17 state. As the court explained it's something lesser than 
18 minimum contacts analysis. We concede that. You don't have to 
19 show purposeful availment. You don't have to show something 
20 beyond some tenuous contact with Utah. Like for example, in 
21 the minimum contacts, contacts, you know, a couple of telephone 
22 calls are probably not going to get you personal jurisdiction 
23 or a letter drafted is not going to get you personal 
24 jurisdiction. Even entering into a contract with a Utah entity 
25 I does not alone get you personal jurisdiction. Here -
14 
1 THE COURT: Not - but, but I'm talking about the, the 
2 rational connection nexus with that party. Jacobsen's a party, 
3 they're very much I guess a Salt Lake County entity. Why 
4 doesn't that satisfy? I mean is that not a rational nexus? 
5 One party to the agreement and the actual transaction being a 
6 Utah, Salt Lake County resident I assume of long standing, the 
7 name looks familiar, but I mean is that not, I guess, am I 
8 missing something on what rational nexus would be required? 
9 Assuming one party's enough. I know you don't concede that. 
10 MR. OLSON: Sure. Assuming one party is enough, yeah, 
11 Jacobsen certainly has a rational nexus to Utah. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 MR. OLSON: If that were the standard. So yes, Your 
14 Honor, that's correct. Our position is that that's not the 
15 standard and that you have -
16 THE COURT: I mean you can come back to anything you 
17 want. But we've talked about Phone Directories and what it 
18 tells us about the impact of a forum selection and/or a consent 
19 to jurisdiction clause on the need for otherwise showing a 
20 basis for personal jurisdiction, what should, shouldn't we be 
21 looking at Wyoming law on this? And if so, what is there? 
22 MR. OLSON: Here's, here's why we're not looking to 
23 Wyoming law. Well, here's how, why we are to a certain extent 
24 and I'll explain the difference. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. OLSON: Exactly. We have clarified that in our, 
in our briefs. I think, I think both of us have, have stuck, 
have stuck pretty closely to that. That the interpretation of 
the form selection clause, or I'm sorry, of the consent to 
jurisdiction clause is governed by Wyoming law. That is the 
interpretation of it -
THE COURT: - talk us to the impact of it on 
jurisdiction analysis because that's Utah. 
MR. OLSON: Precisely. 
THE COURT: [inaudible] back and forth here I'm 
struggling with. 
MR. OLSON: But that's precisely it. That, that's the 
distinction, so -
THE COURT: Okay. 
16 
MR. OLSON: - we can look to Utah - we can look to 
Wyoming law which states generally the same as Utah law that, 
you know, it's consistent with what was stated in the Prows 
case that those are generally enforced, except when they're 
unreasonable, and -
THE COURT: It seems like a different standard on 
reasonable, the best I could tell. It seems like it might be 
harder to show unreasonable in Wyoming than it is in Utah, 
apart from the statute. 
MR. OLSON: Perhaps. We don't have a lot of case law 
on that unfortunately. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. OLSON: We've got this, we've got this one Wyoming 
case that's a very recent case, I think it's a 2000 case, this 
Deardall case, where the court comes out and generally seems to 
follow the restatement. We've got the Prows case in 1993 in 
Utah that generally seems to follow the restatement. In Prows 
perhaps you could say it's a more lenient standard because in 
Prows the court found it unenforceable, while in this Wyoming 
case it was found to be enforceable. But I think generally 
we're dealing with the same issue. Both cases state that they 
will not be enforced if they are unreasonable, -and the party 
claiming unreasonableness does have a high burden to meet in 
establishing that they're unreasonable. 
17 
1 But the reason that, that, that this Wyoming law and 
2 the enforceability of the forum selection clause is not really 
3 at the crux of this argument is that in neither of those cases 
4 that is in all of the governing cases we have on the 
5 enforceability of forum selection clauses personal jurisdiction 
6 was not at issue. The court, the court didn't come out and 
7 say, you know, this is a jurisdiction issue. In both of those 
8 cases the court was looking at a motion under 12(b)(3) to 
9 dismiss for lack of venue. 
10 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 MR. OLSON: We're dealing with venue issues here and 
12 that's all we have in both of those cases and that's one of the 
13 reasons we would argue that that is a venue issue, it is not a 
14 jurisdiction issue. So we can argue about the enforceability 
15 of that all we want, but even if it's enforceable, then you're 
16 still going to have to get over the hurdle of personal 
17 jurisdiction, and that is what they can't get over in this 
18 case. 
19 But the final issue, Your Honor, and then I'll sit 
20 down unless the Court has any other questions, is that if the 
21 forum selection clause is unenforceable, then, you know, we're 
22 not even going to get to the court, to their position that 
23 there's some sort of implied consent to personal jurisdiction. 
24 THE COURT: No, I agree. I think the enforceability 
25 is absolutely [inaudible] and -
1 MR. OLSON: So, and we've addressed that in our briefs 
2 and I'm not going to rehash all the arguments, but I, I will 
3 just emphasize the one point that we raised that in, that in 
4 Utah we have a public policy against enforcing Wyoming 
5 contract, or enforcing -
6 THE COURT: I'm really interested in your position 
7 that, that could be a measure under Wyoming law or is that what 
8 you're really saying? Are you saying here in Utah we should 
9 not even under Wyoming law deem something enforceable that Utah 
10 simply would not as a matter of public policy. I mean does 
11 Utah even get a say in this? 
12 MR. OLSON: Utah does. In determining whether to 
13 extend comity to another state, Utah courts look to Utah public 
14 policies. That has been established. We've cited a case in our 
15 reply brief -
16 [over talking] 
17 THE COURT: But is comity the same as if, if we're 
18 following an agreement or by Wyoming law, is that a comity 
19 question or the parties contract we're abiding by? 
20 MR. OLSON: That's a good question. I think, I think 
21 it's still a comity question because the court is looking to 
22 Wyoming law. When a court in Utah is being asked to extend the 
23 law of another state, then that is a comity question. 
24 THE COURT: I guess it's true to say that under comity 
25 I the law of the selected state, I mean this doesn't seem as 
19 
1 egregious as some, but I could think of an egregious example, 
2 We all could. Go back a 100 or so years and it might be 
3 related to slavery or something. So you say, oh, what am I 
4 going to do here? So I guess that's the analogy, although I'm 
5 stretching it a little. 
6 MR. OLSON: Well, yeah, taking that analogy, say there 
7 is a contract for slavery and we know in Utah there are public 
8 policies against that, you know, going back a 100 years -
9 THE COURT: More than a hundred. 
10 MR. OLSON: There still are. There still are public 
11 policies against that. But using that, using the Court's 
12 analogy, you have a contract provision that under Utah law 
13 would be against Utah public policy, and that's exactly what we 
14 have here. We have something that we think is against Utah 
15 public policy that this Court is being asked to hold up and we 
16 think that's the result that should not, should not happen 
17 based on Utah public policy, which does govern this analysis. 
18 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
19 MR. OLSON: And we would add, Your Honor, taking it a 
20 step further, based on the fact that this Court lacks personal 
21 jurisdiction in this case, this choice of venue, of course, 
22 should not be enforced. That, that goes without saying. The 
23 Court does not need to enforce the party's choice of venue if 
24 there is no personal jurisdiction. That is one reason that 
25 J that is unenforceable, and based on that the Court should go 
20 
1 ahead and dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2). 
2 THE COURT: Thank you for an excellent argument, Mr. 
3 Olson. 
4 Mr. Ball? 
5 MR. BALL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 Preliminarily, Your Honor, Mr. Olson suggested that 
7 it was, we had to cross some sort of a hurdle here today. Mr. 
8 Olson's the moving party, of course, and has the burden of 
9 establishing that there is in fact no personal jurisdiction if 
10 that indeed is what he is trying to do. So we don't have a 
11 burden to meet here in the sense that Mr. Olson suggests that 
12 we do. 
13 Now if you, if you were to read Henderson as we've, 
14 as has been discussed today, to require a nexus with, with 
15 only, with both of the parties before the Court, I can't see 
16 and I've read the case carefully as has everybody else here, I 
17 can't see how Henderson adds a single thing to the law. I mean 
18 it seems to me that the court at that time in that case was, 
19 was announcing an exception. But if it, if the case is to be 
20 read, really to be read to require a nexus with both of the 
21 parties, I don't see how it adds anything to the law. I mean 
22 if we're prepared to accept that this, this rational nexus is 
23 | somehow a reduced standard from minimum contacts, the court did 
24 a very poor job of suggesting, you know, where that line ought 
25 [ to actually be drawn and if that, you know, if that was what 
21 
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iefs. I've listened 
an answer to 
here and that 
igate here 
factorily why 
the, to 
is these 
and they 
should they 
be allowed, why should they want and why should they be allowed 
to suddenly back pedal away from that agreement? I think you 
raised a due process concern earlier, Your Honor, and I think 
that that concern is quite easily taken care of with the fact 
that they just agreed to litigate here. They may not have 
gotten into the nuance of personal juris -
THE COURT: Well, I think, maybe it's not a good 
analogy, but I think of the old jurisdiction cases where they 
say, you know, if you avail yourself the benefits of acting 
within a foreign state you should expect to be held within that 
state. This isn't the same, but you've intentionally taken a 
step. You've done business with someone from a state and venue 
will be, at least venue, as Mr. Olson says. The question is 
whether it's more than venue, whether it's jurisdiction, but, 
yeah, it does seem to me to some extent the due process 
concern. 
22 
1 MR. BALL: I think it's quite, as I say, readily taken 
2 care of and although the contract doesn't get into the nuance 
3 of personal jurisdiction necessarily, at least explicitly, it's 
4 pretty clear that they agreed to litigate here. I think it 
5 uses that, you know, uses the phrase that litigation will take 
6 place in Utah. 
7 THE COURT: Arbitration, litigation or something like 
8 that. 
9 MR. BALL: Yeah, and this can't be a surprise to them. 
10 They can't be taken off guard and they can't seriously contend 
11 that they didn't really agree to be hailed into court here. 
12 Whether they agreed to be subject to the court's jurisdiction 
13 or not, expressly, and I don't think that that concern has been 
14 addressed at all by Teton Builders anywhere. 
15 Now without wishing to, to bore the Court with 
16 rehashing what it's already dealt with and heard, I suggest to 
17 you, to the Court that, that the forum selection clause in this 
18 contract just has to be read to include a consent to 
19 jurisdiction, an implied consent to jurisdiction. It is 
20 absolutely meaningless if not, and it's, as we all know the 
21 Court has a responsibility and a duty to, to give meaning to -
22 THE COURT: Well, and you gave me a lot of cases from 
23 other jurisdictions and I appreciated your thoroughness. But 
24 take a minute on what Justice Howe was doing in Phone 
25 Directories, I mean whether that does mean we've got to treat 
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under Justice Howe's concurrence, we submit, Your Honor, that 
it's irrelevant. Wyoming law controls here and what the court 
did in Henderson really has no bearing on this case at all. 
THE COURT: Wyoming controls as to enforceability and 
as to whether that's sufficient to deal what the contacts issue 
or just as to enforceability? 
MR. BALL: I suggest to you that it applies to both, 
Your Honor, and we've briefed it and -
THE COURT: Even when Utah though is the state 
ultimately exerting the jurisdiction, which has constitutional 
ramifications. I mean at some point if we're going to say 
we're going to exert jurisdiction, shouldn't it be on the basis 
of our own law and we stand behind it, right or wrong in that -
MR. BALL: As you pointed out earlier, Utah extends 
jurisdiction to the fullest limits of due process. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
24 
1 MR. BALL: And I think I, you know, I've addressed the 
2 fact that I can't see how due process could in any way be 
3 offended in this case by exerting jurisdiction over Teton 
4 Builders when they've agreed to litigate here. When they 
5 knowingly signed a contract with a provision in that wasn't 
6 hidden, wasn't boilerplate, wasn't in small print, that clearly 
7 indicates that the parties will litigate here. 
8 THE COURT: Setting that aside for a minute because I 
9 do understand that position, back to what Wyoming law controls 
10 and what it doesn't if you'd clarify for me. I may have side 
11 tracked you there a little. 
12 MR. BALL: No, not at all, Your Honor. It's our 
13 position that Wyoming law controls both the interpretation of 
14 the contract and because the parties agreed that Wyoming law 
15 would govern everything to do with the contract, that it 
16 controls jurisdiction as well. At the end of the day though 
17 whether it does or does not, I think is ultimately irrelevant 
18 because I think jurisdiction lies here whether you go with the 
19 Deardall analysis of reasonableness or whether you go with 
20 Henderson and the rational nexus because as I mentioned 
21 earlier, the rational nexus, Henderson doesn't add anything if 
22 it doesn't require only rational nexus with one. of the parties, 
23 which we quite clearly have here and I think Mr. Olson concedes 
24 that we have here. So, whichever way we get there, the result 
25 ought to be the same and that is that jurisdiction lies here. 
25 
1 Even if for some reason we, we have a problem 
2 implying a consent to jurisdiction into this form selection 
3 clause, and we didn't brief this terribly thoroughly, but I 
4 think it's pretty clear that we have a waiver here. We have 
5 knowing relinquishment, voluntary relinquishment of a known 
6 right. That's the standard that's set out in the Gees Dorfey 
7 Doughty case and, of course, having agreed explicitly to 
8 litigate here, I don't know how Teton Builders could in any way 
9 seriously argue that they haven't voluntarily relinquished 
10 their right. They're not claiming that a gun was held to their 
11 head when they signed the contract or anything of that nature. 
12 So there's, the contract was clearly voluntarily entered into 
13 and they clearly could have, although obviously didn't bargain 
14 for the right to litigate in Wyoming. So even if we've got 
15 problems with the forum selection clause, even if there's a, an 
16 important absence there, I think we have got a waiver and the 
17 same time - and therefore, we can get to the same place along 
18 either path. 
19 Now I mentioned earlier that it, that it's Teton 
20 Builders burden before the Court today to show that this, this 
21 contract provision is unreasonable and in Deardall we learn 
22 that it's a heavy burden. It's not just a burden, it's a heavy 
23 burden and, of course, they really haven't come close in my 
24 estimation to meeting that heavy burden. Teton Builders' best 
25 I argument is based on this Utah statute that clearly I think 
26 
1 under the terms of the contract which provide that Wyoming law 
2 governs has no bearing on, on the court's decision today -
3 THE COURT: Are you going to address the comity 
4 argument? I'd rather enjoy it if so. In terms of why should 
5 we enforce anything under Wyoming law if it is repugnant to 
6 Utah public policy, especially when it's addressed as 
7 explicitly as in our statute? 
8 MR. BALL: I think we have to address Wyoming law, 
9 because that's what the parties agreed the court would address. 
10 Mr. Olson hasn't provided us any indication of what Wyoming's 
11 public policy suggests about a contract of this nature. All 
12 we're, all we have is this, is the Utah statute, which 
13 admittedly suggest that there's a public policy in Utah. But 
14 this is a Wyoming construction project. One of the parties is 
15 from Wyoming. There's no reason that a Utah statute needs to 
16 have any bearing on anything to do with this case. The parties 
17 agreed that in fact it wouldn't have anything to do with this 
18 case. So in terms of comity, everybody expected us to be 
19 looking to Wyoming, that Wyoming law therefore should govern 
20 and I think comity is -
21 THE COURT: Is it a question of degree of repugnance? 
22 I mean we did an analogy that's pretty out there, but I mean is 
23 there some point where the public policy is so strong that we 
24 would say forget Wyoming law, we're not going to follow it? 
25 I That somewhere on the continuum it's okay or is that not even 
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day, Your Honor, 
to that 
whether 
we have 
I don't 
rci not 
unless, 
me, I submit that this is 
a pretty straightforward case. If the forum selection clause 
doesn't include -
THE COURT: That's probably our strongest point of 
disagreement about being straightforward. Straightforward sort 
of, but it's a very close call for me, I'll be very candid. 
MR. BALL: I understand. 
THE COURT: And I'm leaning towards your side and I 
think I'm going to rule for your side. But it's close. 
Because there's a number of issues counter [inaudible] 
policies, considerations. But I do think when you spell it all 
out, I'm inclined to say we can accept jurisdiction, I'll be 
more specific in a moment, within the bounds of the due process 
clause and under those circumstances we should [inaudible] 
agree with the parties and we should leave it to the Supreme 
Court to tell us if we're off base, but I think at some point 
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ours last night, 
[inaudible] 
Services and your Prows, and your argument made it still even 
closer. But I'm still, I'll tell you my basic summary and tell 
me if I'm just off, okay. Again, [inaudible] argue no matter 
what. 
Essentially the parties contracted for a forum 
selection clause. Now I think we have a strong line of case 
law in this state that we're going to honor the contracts of 
the parties, sometimes even when it leads to what perhaps may 
not be a very equitable result and I say that partly because I 
was reversed a couple of years ago on not enforcing an 
arbitration clause. Well, the arbitration clause in fact 
didn't give them anything. It was like we agree to arbitrate 
and if we don't successfully arbitrate within 60 days it's back 
to square one and rescind, and my position from the bench was 
there's no meaningful dispute resolution here, you just stall 
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1 for 60 days and there's nothing. I think Justice Wilkins wrote 
2 a very good decision in which he very courteously pointed out 
3 that it didn't make a lot of sense to him either, but it's what 
4 they contracted for, and that's what they enforced and that 
5 comes up in many different contexts. 
6 So without ambiguity, without undue influence or 
7 something of the kind, the contract I think is a very important 
8 beginning point. Then we go to enforceability. There I think 
9 we all agree Wyoming law applies. Wyoming has a high standard. 
10 It says basically we're going to enforce these clauses. I 
11 think given the Wyoming standard of enforceability, there's a 
12 strong suggestion that as long as the contract is there, it 
13 also implies consent and that's what I believe happens here, 
14 under Wyoming law. 
15 I think we then do shift to Utah law to decide if 
16 this implied consent is sufficient to also extend jurisdiction 
17 to someone who otherwise is neither doing business generally or 
18 has established minimum contacts. For the purposes of this 
19 argument and ruling there are no minimum contacts, no general 
20 J jurisdiction. But I find that under Utah law there is, under 
21 foreign services, a rational nexus to one party and one party 
22 is enough. 
23 The public policy concern you identified very well in 
24 the comity argument. I think if it applies at all, it is a 
25 I continuum. I think there could be a type of circumstance in a 
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hope you two, if you're not there now, get to the point where 
you enjoy Friday mornings starting this way as much as I have. 
Thank you. 
Prepare the order Mr. Ball, sir. 
MR. BALL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
>AUG 2 0 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TETON BUILDERS, a Wyoming corporation, 
and THOMAS R. HUNTER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 
OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Civil No. 030905324 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Defendants Teton Builders and Thomas R. Hunter's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction came before the Court for hearing on August 8, 2003, at 
8:30 a.m. Plaintiff Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. was represented at the hearing by Matthew 
J. Ball of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C. Defendants were represented by Erik A. 
Olson of Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. 
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The Court has reviewed the memoranda and supporting evidence filed by the parties, having 
heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED. 
DATED this ^ 3 £ d a y ofTvfep*****"" 2003. 
By the Court: 
W 
Robert 
Third Distrft 
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Approved as to form: 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Erik A. Olson 
Attorney for Defendants 
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